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Many firms report non-GAAP measures, and there is considerable variation in how firms 
label these measures. I conduct a survey and two experiments to investigate how non-
professional investors perceive non-GAAP labels used in practice, how two commonly-used 
non-GAAP labels affect non-professional investors’ judgments, and the moderating effects 
of awareness of managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting. I find that when awareness 
of discretion in non-GAAP reporting is low, investors are more willing to invest in a firm 
that reports higher non-GAAP earnings with a more diagnostic label, specifically a label that 
implies persistent performance (“core”), compared to when the firm uses a less diagnostic 
non-GAAP label (“adjusted”), even though the non-GAAP earnings are not more persistent 
than GAAP earnings. Results further suggest that when awareness of discretion is low, 
investors rely primarily on the diagnosticity of the non-GAAP label in valuing the firm, 
causing them to overlook additional non-GAAP information. However, the opposite is true 
when awareness of discretion in non-GAAP reporting is high: investors are less willing to 
invest in a firm that reports higher non-GAAP earnings with a label that implies persistent 
performance because they perceive non-GAAP reporting to be less transparent, and therefore 
management to be less credible, when using a label that does not match the underlying 
calculation (i.e., using a label that implies persistence when non-GAAP earnings are not 
persistent). Additional results suggest non-professional investors value increased 
vii 
 
transparency in non-GAAP reporting, be it via the non-GAAP label or other features of the 
non-GAAP disclosure such as the placement of the non-GAAP reconciliation.   
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A non-GAAP metric is one that either includes or excludes amounts that the most 
directly comparable number presented under US GAAP does not (SEC, 2003). Almost all 
large firms consistently report non-GAAP metrics: 97% of the S&P 500 presented at least 
one non-GAAP metric in 2017 (Usvyatsky and Coleman, 2018). Further, firms use a 
variety of terms to label the non-GAAP metrics they report, such as “core” or “adjusted” 
income (see Appendix A for examples). In this study, I first provide descriptive evidence 
on the variation in how firms label their non-GAAP earnings metrics and conduct a survey 
to examine how non-professional investors perceive these labels. Building on these results, 
I conduct two experiments to test how the diagnosticity of non-GAAP labels and investors’ 
awareness of managerial discretion interact to affect information acquisition and 
willingness to invest.  
It is important to understand how non-GAAP labels affect non-professional 
investors’ information acquisition and investment decisions. There is substantial 
managerial discretion involved in non-GAAP reporting; as a result, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) is concerned about the potential for non-GAAP reporting to 
cause confusion among investors. One issue of specific concern is the mislabeling of non-
GAAP metrics (Rapoport, 2013). This concern is apparent in numerous SEC comment 
letters in which the SEC requests firms use non-GAAP labels that more accurately reflect 
the way in which the measure is calculated. For example, a letter to Dime Community 
Bancshares requests the company not use the “core” label “in light of the fact that most of 
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the adjustments [the firm is] making to exclude from core earnings are directly related to 
the on-going operations of a bank” (SEC and Vaughn, 2010; see Appendix B for more 
examples). In my study, I examine how investors react to the diagnosticity of non-GAAP 
labels, which I define as the extent to which the label conveys characteristics of the 
measure beyond the fact that it differs from GAAP. Because my study is the first to 
examine how investors react to non-GAAP labels, I am able to provide regulators 
important evidence on the validity of their concerns regarding the mislabeling of non-
GAAP metrics. My findings about investors’ reliance on diagnostic labels also have 
broader implications for those seeking to understand how the language used in financial 
reporting can affect investors’ information search and decision-making processes.  
It is also important to understand if and how investors’ awareness of managerial 
discretion in non-GAAP reporting influences their reactions to non-GAAP disclosures, 
including non-GAAP labels. Awareness of discretion in non-GAAP reporting can come 
from many sources, including regulatory efforts to educate investors, media outlets, and 
experience with non-GAAP reporting, and can motivate investors to engage in deeper 
processing of non-GAAP reporting. For example, the SEC has recently placed additional 
emphasis on educating non-professional investors, launching initiatives to encourage 
investors to “take control of their financial future” and engaging in outreach tours 
(Clayton, 2019). Past efforts to educate investors about non-GAAP reporting specifically 
include issuing a cautionary notice to investors about the potentially misleading nature of 
non-GAAP metrics, creating a requirement to include a reconciliation of non-GAAP 
measures to the most comparable GAAP measures, and issuing a Compliance & 
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Disclosure Interpretation outlining several ways in which non-GAAP measures can be 
misleading (SEC 2001, 2003, 2018). In addition, media outlets frequently publish stories 
about the high level of managerial discretion present in non-GAAP reporting, as well as 
ways in which non-GAAP measures can be both useful and misleading (e.g. Asper, 
McCoy and Taylor, 2019; Bernstein, 2019; Roberts, 2020). Prior research on non-GAAP 
reporting has also demonstrated that more experienced and sophisticated investors react 
differently to non-GAAP measures than less sophisticated investors, indicating underlying 
differences in their understanding of non-GAAP reporting (Frederickson and Miller, 2004; 
Elliott, 2006).  
I operationalize awareness of discretion in non-GAAP reporting using a regulatory 
bulletin designed to replicate the information provided by regulators and the media about 
non-GAAP reporting. This bulletin informs investors about two important elements of 
discretion in non-GAAP reporting: specifically, that (1) a variety of reconciling items and 
labels exist, and (2) management has substantial discretion over non-GAAP reporting. In 
addition, the bulletin provides a definition of non-GAAP earnings and states that non-
GAAP measures can be useful. Investigating the moderating effect of awareness of 
managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting not only provides important evidence on the 
effects of regulatory actions to increase non-professional investors’ awareness of non-
GAAP metrics, but also sheds light on the potential effect media attention can have on 
investors’ understanding of accounting concepts such as non-GAAP reporting. My study 
can therefore inform regulators about the effectiveness of their efforts to educate investors, 
as well as provide new insights on how the media can serve as an education outlet, 
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ultimately affecting investors’ judgment and decision making. In addition, my findings 
provide evidence on one explanation for how investor sophistication can affect investors’ 
interpretation and use of non-GAAP measures: increased awareness of managerial 
discretion. 
To start my investigation of non-GAAP labels, I first collect a list of the labels S&P 
500 firms use to label their non-GAAP earnings. I find that over 80% of these firms report 
non-GAAP earnings with some form of non-GAAP label, and that over 20 different labels 
are used in practice. Next, I conduct a survey to understand how investors perceive 
differences in these labels. Given I predict investors who are less aware of managerial 
discretion will be more likely to rely on more diagnostic non-GAAP labels, it is important 
to understand how investors interpret the various non-GAAP labels used in practice. In 
addition, my findings about differences in labels can be used to inform future research on 
both the determinants and consequences of non-GAAP label choices.  
Based on this preliminary evidence, I choose to focus on how labels influence 
investors’ perceptions of the persistence of earnings performance as my operationalization 
of a more diagnostic non-GAAP label. While the term “persistence” can be used in a 
variety of ways in a non-GAAP reporting context, such as to describe the extent to which 
reconciling items recur or the extent to which the same non-GAAP label is used across 
multiple periods, in this study I focus on the extent to which the non-GAAP label used 
conveys persistent performance to investors. Persistent performance is particularly 
important in the context of non-GAAP reporting. Non-GAAP earnings metrics are often 
cited as being useful because they present a more representative picture of ongoing 
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performance (i.e., are more persistent) (e.g., PwC, 2019). In addition, persistence is a key 
determinant of the value relevance of earnings (e.g., Ohlson, 1999). Therefore, a non-
GAAP earnings label that implies more persistent performance is diagnostic, or 
informative about a characteristic of earnings, in a particularly important way in an 
investment setting. 
Based on my review of the labels used in practice and the survey data, I select two 
labels—“adjusted” and “core”—to test the effect of non-GAAP labels in two experiments 
with MBA students acting as non-professional investors. According to my survey results, 
these two labels differ in their perceived persistence, but are perceived similarly on other 
dimensions, such as familiarity and clarity. Thus, the perceived persistence of earnings 
associated with these labels is the primary way in which they differ in terms of their 
diagnosticity. “Adjusted” and “core” are also among the top five most commonly used 
labels in practice, and both labels are mentioned in SEC comment letters criticizing the 
mislabeling of non-GAAP metrics.1  
To develop hypotheses about the effects of non-GAAP labels, I draw on the 
elaboration likelihood model from psychology. This model predicts the likelihood of an 
individual engaging in detailed processing of a message. According to the elaboration 
likelihood model, there are two routes through which an individual can process a message: 
the peripheral route or the central route (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986).2 When using the 
                                                 
1 Garavaglia and Gee (2020) provide descriptive statistics on non-GAAP label usage from 2003-2017; over 
35% of firms use the “adjusted” label during this time period, and roughly 2% use the “core” label. However, 
custom labels, which are more likely to be diagnostic, account for over 10% of the total. Thus, testing the 
“core” label as an example of a diagnostic label is informative for a significant number of labels used in 
practice. 
2 This theory is related to other dual process theories (e.g. Schneider and Schiffrin, 1977; Chaiken, 1980). 
However, there are numerous dual processing models that do not always lead to the same predictions (see 
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peripheral route, individuals are more likely to rely on simple, heuristic cues. Reactions 
due to peripheral route processing are therefore primarily related to conclusions reached 
based on these cues. When using the central route however, individuals engage in careful 
and thoughtful consideration of the attributes of a message. Reactions due to central route 
processing are therefore primarily related to conclusions reached about overall message 
quality (Hilligoss and Rieh, 2018). Whether an individual is more likely to use heuristic, 
peripheral route processing or detailed, central route processing is a function of the 
individual’s ability and motivation to process a message. Important to my setting, context-
specific knowledge is likely to increase an individual’s motivation to engage in central 
route processing.  
Based on this theory, I predict that when investors’ awareness of discretion in non-
GAAP reporting is low, they will rely on peripheral route processing to form evaluate the 
non-GAAP metric reported by the firm. Specifically, I expect these investors will focus on 
heuristic cues to form an impression about the non-GAAP metric. If the label is diagnostic, 
investors will use the label as a heuristic cue about non-GAAP earnings. In my setting, I 
manipulate whether the non-GAAP label implies persistent earnings as my manipulation of 
diagnosticity. In cases where the non-GAAP label implies persistence, investors will 
assume the reported non-GAAP measure is representative of expected ongoing earnings 
and will be less likely to seek out additional information. However, when the label is less 
diagnostic, investors will be less able to use the label as a heuristic cue. Instead, they will 
be more likely to acquire additional information about the non-GAAP measure, such as the 
                                                 




reconciliation from non-GAAP income to GAAP income, to find additional cues. As such, 
I predict investors who are less aware of managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting will 
be more likely to access the reconciliation from non-GAAP income to GAAP income 
when the firm uses a less diagnostic label because investors will be searching for 
additional cues. The non-GAAP reconciliation in my experiment shows two consecutive 
years in which the firm removes a routine expense from GAAP earnings to arrive at non-
GAAP earnings. The removal of the same expense in successive years should serve as a 
cue that the non-GAAP earnings do not represent ongoing performance.3 I therefore 
predict that investors who are less aware of managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting 
are more likely to view non-GAAP earnings as persistent when a more persistent label is 
used, and are therefore likely to be more willing to invest.  
When awareness of managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting is high, investors 
are motivated to engage in deeper, central route processing of non-GAAP metrics rather 
than relying on the label as a heuristic cue. I therefore predict no difference in 
reconciliation access across labels when awareness of managerial discretion in non-GAAP 
reporting is high. Instead, I predict these investors will use central route processing to 
evaluate the overall message quality, considering the entire non-GAAP reporting package 
in determining their willingness to invest. Again, by design my experiment tests the effect 
of non-GAAP labels in a setting in which the firm adds a recurring expense (stock-based 
compensation) to GAAP income when calculating non-GAAP income. This reconciling 
                                                 
3 The removal of an expense item in multiple years creates a less persistent measure of income because the 
expense item is likely to persist in future years. As a result, future income will be less related to this non-
GAAP measure as the expense is likely to persist.  
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item creates a mismatch with a non-GAAP label that implies persistence, as future 
earnings are likely to continue to be reduced by the excluded expense. In contrast, a less 
diagnostic label such as “adjusted” does not imply persistence and in fact encourages 
investors to seek out additional information. Taken together, this indicates investors are 
likely to evaluate non-GAAP reporting quality as being higher in the case of a less 
diagnostic label. Prior research demonstrates assessments of message quality directly 
influence assessments of source credibility (Slater and Rouner, 1996). In my setting, I 
therefore predict assessments of the quality of non-GAAP reporting will influence 
investors’ assessments of management credibility. Thus, I predict investors will be more 
(less) willing to invest when the firm uses a more (less) diagnostic non-GAAP label due to 
lower (higher) perceptions of message quality and, by extension, management credibility.  
I test these predictions in a 2 × 2 between-participants experiment in which I 
manipulate the non-GAAP label as being either more diagnostic, in this case implying 
persistent earnings (“core”), or less diagnostic (“adjusted”) and the level of awareness of 
managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting. Consistent with my predictions, I find an 
interaction between non-GAAP labels and awareness of managerial discretion for both 
access to the non-GAAP reconciliation and willingness to invest. With low awareness of 
managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting, investors are significantly less likely to 
access the reconciliation from non-GAAP income to GAAP income when the firm labels 
non-GAAP earnings as “core,” which is more diagnostic because it implies persistent 
performance. In addition, I find these investors assess non-GAAP income as more 
persistent when the firm uses this more diagnostic label (“core”), resulting in greater 
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willingness to invest. On the other hand, investors with high awareness of managerial 
discretion are equally likely to access the reconciliation from non-GAAP earnings to 
GAAP earnings, regardless of label. Further, I find investors with high awareness of 
discretion find management to be more credible when the firm uses a less diagnostic label 
because this label is more transparent, resulting in a greater willingness to invest.  
I conduct a second experiment to further examine the potential benefits of increased 
transparency in non-GAAP reporting. Specifically, experiment two is designed to test 
whether awareness of discretion causes investors to react to non-GAAP labels specifically, 
or if these investors consider the entire non-GAAP disclosure package. I find that 
compared to reporting only GAAP earnings, investors with high awareness of managerial 
discretion react more positively to firms reporting higher non-GAAP earnings, regardless 
of label, when the firm prominently discloses the reconciliation from non-GAAP to GAAP 
earnings. 4 In conjunction with the results of experiment one, these findings suggest that 
awareness of managerial discretion causes investors to consider the overall non-GAAP 
disclosure strategy, and react positively to more transparent disclosures. In addition, the 
results of experiment two suggest one potential regulatory intervention to counteract the 
use of misleading labels is to require prominent reconciliations.5   
                                                 
4 Across both experiments, I find little evidence that investors who are aware of discretion in non-GAAP 
reporting react negatively to the “core” label. One explanation for this somewhat surprising result is my use 
of stock-based compensation as the expense item excluded from non-GAAP earnings, which may be viewed 
as appropriate by investors. See Chapter 6 for additional discussion.  
5 My findings do not speak to the effect of a more transparent reconciliation on investors with low awareness 
of managerial discretion. However, Elliott (2006) tests the effects of the presence and absence of a 
reconciliation on investors with varying levels of sophistication and finds less sophisticated investors are less 
likely to rely on non-GAAP measures when a reconciliation is present. Given Elliott (2006) prominently 
presents the reconciliation in her materials, it is reasonable to predict a more prominent reconciliation would 
result in lower reliance on non-GAAP measures, including their labels, for investors with low awareness of 
managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting.  
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My study contributes to the accounting literature on non-GAAP reporting, which 
has examined how specific elements of non-GAAP reporting influence non-professional 
investors. Previous research has found that emphasis on non-GAAP measures influences 
less sophisticated investors because emphasis alters investors’ perceptions of the 
importance of the non-GAAP metric (Elliott, 2006). Although the SEC has taken action to 
prevent firms from placing greater emphasis on non-GAAP measures than GAAP 
measures, there are other ways in which firms may seek to alter investors’ perceptions of 
non-GAAP metrics, such as by highlighting the non-GAAP metric in an infographic 
(Brown, Elliott and Grant, 2018). I contribute to this stream of research by documenting 
non-GAAP labels are another channel through which firms may alter investors’ 
perceptions of non-GAAP measures.  
Research also examines the effect of investor sophistication on investors’ reactions 
to non-GAAP reporting. Prior research finds less-sophisticated investors (e.g., MBA 
students) are more likely to rely on non-GAAP information that is emphasized by 
managers than more sophisticated investors (e.g., analysts) (e.g. Frederickson and Miller, 
2004; Elliott, 2006; Allee, Bhattacharya, Black and Christensen, 2007). While this research 
highlights the importance of regulatory action to protect non-professional investors from 
being misled by managers’ non-GAAP reporting, my study is the first to directly examine 
the effects of knowledge about managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting specifically. 
Given the SEC has taken steps to educate non-professional investors about discretion in 
non-GAAP reporting, it is important to understand the direct impact of these efforts on 
their intended audience. My findings also provide evidence on one potential explanation 
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for why investors of varying sophistication levels react differently to non-GAAP metrics: 
differences in awareness of managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting.  
My findings are also informative to regulators. I find that when awareness of 
managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting is low, non-professional investors rely on 
the non-GAAP label in assessing firms’ non-GAAP metrics. This finding indicates the 
SEC’s concerns about the potential for non-GAAP labels to mislead investors are justified. 
In addition, I directly test the effect of awareness of discretion in non-GAAP reporting on 
investors, making my results informative to regulators about the impact of their actions to 
educate investors about this fact. My results suggest SEC guidance on non-GAAP 
reporting can be effective for investors who read it. I also find that increasing the 
prominence of the non-GAAP reconciliation largely undoes the effect of labeling on 
investors with high awareness of managerial discretion, indicating that one potential 
regulatory solution for misleading non-GAAP labels is to require more transparent 
reconciliations.  
Last, my findings are informative to managers. I find awareness of managerial 
discretion in non-GAAP reporting causes investors to react more positively to firms that 
are more upfront in their non-GAAP reporting. While these findings are consistent with 
prior research on the importance of corporate transparency (see Bushman and Smith, 2003 
for a review), my findings highlight the potential benefits of engaging in more transparent 
non-GAAP reporting specifically. This is particularly important as non-GAAP disclosures 
are often criticized for their lack of transparency, indicating some reluctance from 
managers to engage in transparent non-GAAP reporting practices (e.g. Tysiac, 2018). 
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Consistent with a pervasive lack of transparency, I find less than 10% of S&P 500 firms 
present a non-GAAP reconciliation adjacent to the original reporting of the non-GAAP 
measure. My results suggest that obfuscating non-GAAP information in this way may be 






Institutional History & Current Practice 
 I examine investors’ reactions to non-GAAP labels and the moderating effect of 
investors’ awareness of managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting. This chapter 
provides an overview of non-GAAP reporting and additional information about the history 
of regulatory efforts related to non-GAAP reporting, followed by a review of academic 
research on non-GAAP reporting. The section concludes with information about non-
GAAP labels in practice and results of a survey documenting investors’ perceptions of 
non-GAAP labels.  
2.1 Non-GAAP Regulatory History 
A non-GAAP measure is one that either includes or excludes amounts that the most 
directly comparable measure presented under U.S. GAAP does not (SEC, 2003). For 
example, a non-GAAP income measure may adjust GAAP income to remove one-time 
gains or losses. Although the goal of non-GAAP reporting is often to present investors 
with a more accurate picture of ongoing firm performance (e.g. Black, Christensen, 
Ciesielski and Whipple, 2020), regulators have expressed concerns about the potential for 
investors to be misled by non-GAAP measures. The SEC released its first commentary on 
non-GAAP reporting in 2001 to warn investors about the potentially misleading nature of 
non-GAAP reporting (SEC, 2001). Shortly thereafter, the SEC issued Regulation G, 
“Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures,” amended the existing Item 10 of 
Regulation S-K, and created a website of frequently asked questions regarding non-GAAP 
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measures (SEC, 2002, 2003, 2019).6 Together these regulations significantly altered the 
non-GAAP reporting environment, most notably by requiring a reconciliation of non-
GAAP measures to the most comparable GAAP measures, and equal prominence of the 
GAAP measures that are most comparable to non-GAAP measures presented in 
disclosures.  
Research suggests that Regulation G decreased non-GAAP reporting and related 
managerial opportunism, at least for the period immediately following its issuance.  For 
example, Kolev, Marquardt and McVay (2008) find exclusions from non-GAAP earnings 
are of higher quality after Regulation G, and firms with lower quality non-GAAP earnings 
in the pre-period are more likely to cease reporting non-GAAP measures in the post-
period. Additional studies document a significant reduction in the mispricing of non-
GAAP earnings after the passage of Regulation G (Zhang and Zheng, 2011), as well as a 
decrease in evidence that investors are being misled post-Regulation G (Jennings and 
Marques, 2011).   
However, beginning in 2010, SEC commissioners again began to express concerns 
about issues surrounding non-GAAP reporting. In 2016, the SEC issued a Compliance & 
Disclosure Interpretation (C&DI) of regulations on non-GAAP measures, which it updated 
in 2017 and 2018 (SEC, 2018). In late 2018, the SEC issued an enforcement action against 
ADT Inc. for giving greater prominence to “adjusted” income metrics than the comparable 
GAAP metrics (SEC, 2018). This was the first enforcement action related specifically to 
the presentation of non-GAAP measures without additional findings of a material 
                                                 
6 See Black, Christensen, Ciesielski and Whipple (2018) for a comprehensive regulatory timeline. 
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misstatement or omission in calculating the metric (Silverman, Grabar, Janghorbani and 
Solomon, 2019).  
The SEC has not only warned investors about the risks associated with non-GAAP 
measures, but has also highlighted the benefits of non-GAAP reporting. For example, in 
the original cautionary notice on non-GAAP reporting, the SEC stated non-GAAP 
measures can “serve useful purposes” and “companies may quite appropriately wish to 
emphasize the results of core operations” (SEC, 2001). Perhaps most tellingly, the SEC has 
continued to allow non-GAAP reporting, stating that these measures “can add critical 
insight for investors” (Bricker, 2019). Specifically regarding non-GAAP labels, the SEC 
has indicated that non-GAAP labels, and management discretion over labeling, can be 
informative to investors. For example, SEC comment letters often request firms use labels 
that more clearly explain non-GAAP metrics rather than requiring the adoption of a 
specific label.  
2.2 Research on Non-GAAP Reporting 
Prior accounting research on non-GAAP disclosures has examined the motivations 
and determinants of non-GAAP reporting, as well as how non-GAAP reporting influences 
both individual judgment and decision-making and market outcomes. This previous 
research hypothesizes that there are two key motivations for management to report non-
GAAP figures: (1) to shape market participants’ views of negative performance (the 
obfuscation hypothesis), and/or (2) to highlight a more meaningful and informative 
predictor of future economic performance (the informativeness hypothesis) (Bradshaw and 
Sloan, 2002). In addition, researchers have theorized and tested the impact of non-GAAP 
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reporting on analysts and investors, documenting how non-GAAP reporting can influence 
their judgments and decisions (Frederickson and Miller, 2004; Elliott, 2006).  
To address questions about the determinants and consequences of non-GAAP 
reporting, researchers have leveraged existing theories of discretionary disclosure. In an 
initial investigation of the determinants of non-GAAP reporting, Bradshaw and Sloan 
(2002) present competing hypotheses on mangers’ motivations to report non-GAAP 
metrics. The first is that non-GAAP reporting is a function of management’s desire to 
mislead and obfuscate poor performance. While this is consistent with lay theories 
presented by the financial press and SEC, it contradicts the efficient market hypothesis in 
that the market should not be “fooled” by misleading disclosures (Bradshaw and Sloan, 
2002).  The second hypothesis is that non-GAAP reporting is a function of management’s 
desire to provide more informative metrics to the public, and is based on the idea that 
accounting standards have increased in complexity over time. According to this theory, 
this increase in complexity has rendered metrics produced under traditional GAAP 
reporting to be less relevant for investors. For example, managers may wish to remove 
transitory items to produce a more value-relevant earnings metric.  
Early research found an increase in both the frequency of non-GAAP reporting as 
well as the magnitude of non-GAAP measures relative to GAAP over the period from 
1985-1997 (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002). Additional research demonstrated that despite 
high levels of expense exclusions in the calculation of non-GAAP metrics leading to 
predictably lower cash flows, investors nevertheless relied on non-GAAP measures, 
providing preliminary support for concerns surrounding the use of non-GAAP measures to 
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obfuscate poor performance and mislead investors (Doyle, Lundholm and Soliman, 2003). 
Further, although firms with low GAAP earnings informativeness were more likely to 
disclose non-GAAP measures, strategic considerations were also found to be an important 
determinant of non-GAAP reporting (Lougee and Marquardt, 2004). Initial experimental 
research demonstrated that non-professional investors were more likely to rely on non-
GAAP measures than analysts (Frederickson and Miller, 2004), but that this relationship 
reversed in the presence of a tabular reconciliation of non-GAAP income to GAAP 
income. Specifically, in the presence of a reconciliation, non-professional investors were 
less likely to rely on non-GAAP measures than analysts (Elliott, 2006). In sum, early 
research on non-GAAP reporting demonstrated that the market relied on non-GAAP 
reporting and provided support for both the obfuscation and information hypotheses.   
More recent research shows that despite an initial drop-off in non-GAAP reporting 
after the passage of Regulation G, non-GAAP reporting is once again prevalent (Black et 
al., 2020). In addition, non-GAAP metrics provide greater comparability to industry peers 
relative to GAAP reporting, suggesting that non-GAAP measures are often reported with 
the objective of informing the market (Black et al., 2020). Firms with a loss in the current 
year provide incrementally more informative non-GAAP earnings metrics (Leung and 
Veenman, 2018), as do firms that have recently violated a debt covenant (Christensen, Pei, 
Pierce, and Tan, 2019).  Research also demonstrates that non-GAAP reporting decreases 
aggressive GAAP reporting (Guggenmos, Rennekamp and Rupar, 2019). However, CEOs 
are rewarded with higher pay for the use of opportunistic non-GAAP reporting, indicating 
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incentives still exist to engage in opportunistic non-GAAP reporting (Guest, Kothari and 
Pozen, 2020).  
2.3 Non-GAAP Labels in Practice 
 Non-GAAP labels are the terms used to identify non-GAAP measures reported by a 
firm, such as “adjusted” or “core” income (see Appendix A for examples). In addition to 
the more general concerns about firms’ non-GAAP reporting practices discussed above, 
the SEC has also expressed specific concerns about the mislabeling of non-GAAP metrics 
(see Appendix B for examples). Mislabeling non-GAAP metrics has been defined as the 
use of common, well-defined terms to refer to firms’ own custom performance metrics 
(Rapoport, 2013). 
To collect a sample of non-GAAP labels used in practice, I examine all S&P 500 
firms’ Q4 2016 earnings releases. I find these firms collectively use over 20 labels to 
describe their non-GAAP earnings metrics. However, several labels are used by only one 
firm or are industry specific. The labels used by only one firm include: “managed,” 
“guidance basis,” “historical basis,” “economic,” “before changes/gains” and “modified.” 
Industry specific terms include “FFO,” which is defined as funds from operations by real 
estate investment trusts, “net investment income” by financial firms, and various tax-
related terms. Thus, I use the following list of 12 non-GAAP earnings labels for my 
survey: “adjusted,” “non-GAAP,” “operating,” “constant currency,” “core,” “organic,” 
“comparable,” “underlying,” “same-store,”  “ongoing,” “normalized,” and “pro forma” 
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(see Table 1 for frequencies). In total, I find over 84% of S&P 500 firms use one or more 
of these terms to label the non-GAAP earnings metrics they report.7  
To provide preliminary evidence on how non-professional investors perceive the 
persistence of non-GAAP earnings with these labels, I conduct a survey with working 
professional MBA students from a highly rated MBA program in the United States.8 I 
focus specifically on the extent to which labels communicate persistent performance as 
non-GAAP measures are often reported to provide a more persistent measure of earnings 
(e.g., White, 2016). In addition, earnings persistence has clear implications for firm value. 
Specifically, more persistent earnings are impounded into value at a higher rate (e.g., 
Ohlson, 1999). To measure perceived persistence, I ask participants to assess the extent to 
which each label conveys persistence on a 101-point scale from -50 to +50 where -50 
(+50) is labeled “temporary” (“ongoing”). The midpoint of each scale is labeled as “neither 
temporary nor ongoing.” I also collect measures of investors’ perceptions of each label 
along nine additional dimensions to rule out possible alternative explanations for my 
results.9 Specifically, I collect investors’ perceptions of each label’s positivity, familiarity, 
reliability, officiality, complexity, clarity, transparency, abstractness and trustworthiness.  
                                                 
7 The total number of labels used as presented in Table 1 exceeds 500 as some firms use more than one label 
for their non-GAAP income metrics. In total, 421 firms present a non-GAAP income metric (84.2% of my 
sample), of which 133 use more than one label (31.6% of firms that report a non-GAAP income metric). The 
most common labels used in conjunction with another label are “adjusted” and “non-GAAP.” Thirty-two 
firms use both “adjusted” and “non-GAAP,” 65 firms use “adjusted” in conjunction with another label (e.g. 
“adjusted operating income”), and 18 firms use “non-GAAP” in conjunction with another label (e.g. 
“operating income (non-GAAP)”).  
8 All studies received IRB approval at the author’s institution.  
9 Participants also assess the pairwise similarity of the non-GAAP labels presented in Table 1 for use in a 
multidimensional scaling analysis (see Giguere, 2006 for an overview). Results of this analysis (untabulated) 
generally support persistence as the primary dimension explaining differences between non-GAAP labels. 
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Mean persistence judgments are presented in Table 1, with a graphical depiction in 
Panel B of Figure 1. Consistent with persistence being the primary driver of differences in 
investors’ perceptions of the “core” and “adjusted” label, I find both labels are significantly 
different from the midpoint of the persistence scale, but in opposite directions. That is, 
earnings labeled as “core” (31.03) are perceived to be more persistent than the midpoint, 
and earnings labeled as “adjusted” (mean = -19.84) are perceived to be less persistent than 
the midpoint (both p < 0.01). In addition, a paired t-test confirms that participants’ ratings 
of perceived persistence differ for the “adjusted” and “core” labels (means of -19.84 and 
31.03 respectively, t78 = -13.24, p < 0.01).  
The only other dimensions for which both labels differ significantly from the 
midpoint are familiarity, officiality and clarity. However, for these other dimensions, the 
“core” and “adjusted” labels differ from the midpoint in the same direction; that is, both 
labels are viewed as being relatively familiar, official and clear. Together these findings 
support persistence as being the primary difference in investors’ perceptions of the “core” 
and “adjusted” labels. These labels are also among the top five most commonly used labels 
in practice (see Table 1). Thus, I focus on these two labels in my experiments. To provide 
additional evidence on the role of persistence in my specific experimental context, I also 






3.1 Elaboration Likelihood Model  
The elaboration likelihood model predicts the likelihood of an individual engaging 
in detailed processing of a message when forming an opinion about that message (Petty 
and Cacioppo, 1986). When elaboration likelihood is low, individuals are likely to engage 
in peripheral processing, which involves relying on a simple cue or cues to determine the 
validity of a message without considering its overall quality. Reactions due to peripheral 
processing are related primarily to reliance on these heuristic cues. When elaboration 
likelihood is high, individuals are likely to engage in a process called central processing, 
which involves careful and thoughtful consideration of attributes of the message to arrive 
at a conclusion. Under central route processing, reactions are driven by evaluations of 
message quality (Hilligoss and Rieh, 2008).  
The likelihood of engaging in central processing as opposed to peripheral 
processing is affected by both situational factors and individual differences. For example, 
studies have shown that distraction and repetition both affect depth of processing, albeit in 
different directions. Petty, Wells, and Brock (1976) demonstrate that when individuals are 
given a distraction task, their depth of processing decreases due to a decreased ability to 
concentrate on processing the message. On the other hand, Cacciopo and Petty (1985) 
demonstrate that when a message is repeated, depth of processing increases due to an 
increased ability to process the message. Individual differences that affect an individual’s 
depth of processing include the personal relevance of the message and need for cognition. 
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Petty and Cacioppo (1979) and Cacioppo, Petty and Morris (1983) demonstrate that as the 
personal relevance of a message and an individual’s need for cognition increase, so too 
does the depth of processing as a result of increased motivation. 
In sum, the likelihood of elaboration is a function of an individual’s ability and 
motivation to process a message. For example, children have low motivation and ability to 
engage in central processing; they are unlikely to carefully consider attributes of a message 
to arrive at a conclusion. Instead, children are likely to engage in peripheral processing, 
relying on simple cues like affective reactions to arrive at a conclusion. As children age, 
their motivation and ability to engage in central processing increase. Boush, Friestad and 
Rose (1994) demonstrate that as children age, their skepticism toward advertising 
increases, resulting in deeper processing of advertising messages. This study is particularly 
notable, as it documents a direct link between knowledge of advertiser tactics and 
increased motivation to process advertisements. Analogizing to the non-GAAP setting, this 
suggests that knowledge of managerial discretion could increase investors’ motivation to 
process non-GAAP disclosures more carefully.  
Limited research in accounting draws on the elaboration likelihood model, and that 
which does is primarily based in the auditing domain. For example, Peytcheva, Wright and 
Majoor (2014) demonstrate that principles-based accounting standards result in higher 
process accountability for auditors than rules-based accounting standards, and that higher 
process accountability increases auditors’ motivation and depth of processing as well as 
their demand for audit evidence. Bhattaracharjee and Brown (2017) find auditors who 
share an alumni-affiliation with a client manager engage in deeper processing of messages 
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from the client because shared group membership serves to motivate more systematic, or 
central route, processing. Backof (2015) draws on the elaboration likelihood model to 
explain why jurors in an auditor negligence case are more readily able to attend to written 
evidence (audit workpapers) than oral evidence (testimonies), finding that audit 
workpapers documenting consideration of alternative accounting treatments increase 
perceived auditor negligence. In a financial reporting and investment context, Elliott, 
Hodge and Sedor (2012) test the effect of delivery mode on depth of information 
processing, finding differences between investor reactions to restatements when the 
restatement is disclosed in a text-based versus video-based press release. 
3.2 Theoretical Model  
In the next chapter, I draw on the elaboration likelihood model to develop 
directional hypotheses about how non-GAAP labels influence investors’ information 
search process and investment willingness. Although the directional effects I predict are 
specific to my setting, I expect the theoretical model supporting these predictions to 
generalize. Specifically, I posit that when awareness of managerial discretion in non-
GAAP reporting is low, investors will be more likely to engage in peripheral route 
processing to evaluate a firm’s non-GAAP reporting. This will involve relying on non-
GAAP labels when they convey a meaning that is relevant to investment decisions, and 
only considering reconciling items when the label does not provide useful information. 
Conversely, I predict that when awareness of managerial discretion in non-GAAP 
reporting is high, investors will be more likely to engage in central route processing. This 
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will entail considering both the non-GAAP label and reconciling items in arriving at 






4.1 Hypothesis One – Reconciliation Access  
To hypothesize about the effects of non-GAAP labels and awareness of managerial 
discretion in non-GAAP reporting on investors’ information acquisition and investment 
willingness, I draw on the elaboration likelihood model (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). This 
model predicts the depth of processing an individual will engage in to interpret and 
evaluate a message, and is appropriate for my setting as I seek to hypothesize about how 
investors will react to firms’ non-GAAP disclosures. The elaboration likelihood model 
posits that depth of processing is determined by an individual’s ability and motivation to 
process a message. In my setting, I predict investors’ motivation to engage in deeper 
processing of non-GAAP disclosures will be affected by their awareness of managerial 
discretion in non-GAAP reporting.  
When awareness of managerial discretion is low, I expect investors will have low 
motivation to engage in deeper processing of non-GAAP disclosures given they are less 
likely to be aware of the discretion involved in non-GAAP reporting. Instead, investors 
will be more likely to engage in peripheral processing of non-GAAP metrics. This will 
involve using heuristic cues to evaluate the non-GAAP measure being reported. In the case 
of a more diagnostic non-GAAP label, investors are more likely to be able to evaluate the 
non-GAAP metric using the label alone relative to when a less diagnostic label is used. In 
my experimental setting specifically, a more diagnostic label is one that conveys higher 
levels of earnings persistence. Non-GAAP measures are often cited as being useful 
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because they provide a more accurate representation of ongoing (i.e. persistent) earnings, 
and persistent earnings are impounded into valuation at a higher rate (PwC, 2019; Ohlson, 
1999). In the case of a less diagnostic label, investors will be more likely to look for 
additional information to use as a cue for evaluating the reported non-GAAP metric, 
resulting in a higher likelihood that investors will access the reconciliation from non-
GAAP income to GAAP income.  
When awareness of managerial discretion is high, investors will have greater 
motivation to engage in more careful processing of non-GAAP disclosures to evaluate the 
overall message quality. I therefore predict investors with high levels of awareness of 
managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting will not be influenced by the non-GAAP 
label when deciding whether or not to access the reconciliation from non-GAAP income to 
GAAP income. Instead, investors with high levels of awareness will be motivated to 
engage in deeper, central route processing and will seek out additional information about 
the non-GAAP metrics presented, regardless of label.  
To summarize, I predict investors with low levels of awareness of managerial 
discretion in non-GAAP reporting will use peripheral route processing and will therefore 
treat a diagnostic non-GAAP label as a heuristic cue about the non-GAAP measure being 
reported. When a less diagnostic label is used, investors will seek out additional cues to use 
in understanding the metric, which in my setting will entail accessing the reconciliation 
from non-GAAP income to GAAP income. Investors with high awareness of managerial 
discretion in non-GAAP reporting will be motivated to engage in central route processing 
regardless of label, and will therefore not be influenced by the non-GAAP label when 
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determining whether or not to access the reconciliation. This hypothesis is stated formally 
below.  
H1: When awareness of managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting is low 
(high), a more diagnostic non-GAAP label will (will not) decrease investors’ 
likelihood of accessing the reconciliation from non-GAAP income to GAAP 
income.  
 
A summary of my predictions can also be found in Table 2, with graphical 
depictions in Figure 3.  
4.2 Hypothesis Two – Willingness to Invest 
In H1, I predict differences in reconciliation access. In my study, investors who 
access the reconciliation see the firm removes an ongoing expense (stock-based 
compensation) in two consecutive years. This repeated removal of an expense suggests that 
non-GAAP earnings do not represent ongoing performance, as the expense is likely to 
continue in the future. This is important, as more persistent earnings are impounded into 
value at a higher rate (e.g. Ohlson, 1999). In addition, adding back an ongoing expense 
means that my setting involves the common situation in which non-GAAP earnings exceed 
GAAP earnings. Thus, differences in reconciliation access and the diagnosticity of the 
non-GAAP label also have consequences for willingness to invest. 
 When awareness of managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting is low, investors 
will use a diagnostic non-GAAP label as a heuristic cue. In this case, the non-GAAP label 
will serve as a cue that non-GAAP earnings are persistent, resulting in a lower likelihood 
of accessing the reconciliation from non-GAAP to GAAP income and greater willingness 
to invest. On the other hand, a less diagnostic label does not provide a heuristic cue. This 
will result in a higher likelihood of accessing the reconciliation to search for additional 
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cues to use when evaluating the metric. After accessing the reconciliation, these investors 
will assign a lower level of persistence to non-GAAP earnings based on the content of the 
reconciliation; namely, the exclusion of a recurring expense. Thus, I predict investors with 
low levels of awareness of discretion in non-GAAP reporting will be more willing to 
invest when a firm uses a more diagnostic label relative to when the firm uses a less 
diagnostic label due to perceptions of both higher and more persistent non-GAAP earnings. 
When awareness of managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting is high, I predict 
no difference in reconciliation access. Instead, I predict investors will be motivated to 
access the reconciliation regardless of label to evaluate the overall quality of the message.  
When accessing the reconciliation, these investors will observe that adding back a 
recurring expense (stock-based compensation) for two consecutive years creates a 
mismatch with the use of a diagnostic non-GAAP label that implies persistent earnings. 
This mismatch is likely to result in a lower evaluation of the quality of the non-GAAP 
measure. A less diagnostic label does not create this mismatch, and also may be viewed as 
an indication that investors should seek additional information. This more transparent 
reporting choice is likely to result in a higher evaluation of the quality of the non-GAAP 
disclosure.  
Prior research demonstrates assessments of message quality directly affect 
assessments of source credibility (Slater and Rouner, 1996). Thus, I predict investors’ 
evaluations of non-GAAP quality will also affect their assessments of management 
credibility and, ultimately, their willingness to invest. In my experiment, investors observe 
a mismatch between the more diagnostic label and the underlying calculation. I predict this 
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mismatch will result in lower assessments of message quality and therefore management 
credibility. This is consistent with prior research demonstrating more sophisticated 
investors are able to see through impression management techniques and react negatively 
when they perceive firms to be intentionally misleading investors (Tan, Wang and Zhou, 
2014). However, when investors in my experiment see a less diagnostic label, they may 
perceive management as being transparent about the nature of the non-GAAP measure 
(i.e., that it is adjusted) and encouraging investors to seek additional information via the 
label choice. I predict this more transparent choice will result in higher evaluations of 
message quality and therefore management credibility. This positive reaction is consistent 
with research demonstrating individuals are more likely to trust an adviser when the 
adviser is upfront about conflicting incentives, as well as with past accounting research 
demonstrating investors initially assess management to be more credible when they issue 
more forthcoming disclosures (Cain, Loewenstein and Moore, 2005; Mercer, 2005).  
Both of these effects—reacting negatively to a firm using an inappropriate label 
and reacting positively to a firm being more transparent—predict the same directional 
effect for investors with high awareness of managerial discretion. Specifically, both effects 
predict investors will react more (less) favorably to a non-GAAP measure with a less 
(more) diagnostic label when the underlying calculation reveals less persistent non-GAAP 
earnings. As a result, I predict greater willingness to invest in my setting when awareness 
of management’s discretion in non-GAAP reporting is high and the firm uses a less 
diagnostic label.  
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To summarize, I predict that when awareness of managerial discretion in non-
GAAP reporting is low, investors will be more willing to invest when the firm uses a 
diagnostic non-GAAP label that implies persistence. When awareness of discretion is high, 
investors will be less willing to invest when the firm uses a diagnostic non-GAAP label 
that implies persistence. This hypothesis is stated formally below. 
H2: When awareness of managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting is low 
(high) and non-GAAP earnings exceed GAAP earnings, a more diagnostic non-
GAAP label implying persistence used in conjunction with a less persistent 
calculation of non-GAAP earnings will increase (decrease) willingness to invest. 
 
4.3 Applying the Theoretical Model 
 
In Chapter 3, I present a theoretical model for how investors’ awareness of 
discretion in non-GAAP reporting affects their willingness to invest. Specifically, I posit 
that when awareness of managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting is low, investors will 
be more likely to engage in peripheral route processing to evaluate a firm’s non-GAAP 
reporting. In my specific experimental setting, this will involve consideration of the 
persistence of non-GAAP earnings based either on the non-GAAP label or the nature of 
the reconciling items. Conversely, I predict that when awareness of managerial discretion 
in non-GAAP reporting is high, investors will be more likely to engage in central route 
processing. In my setting, this will involve investors’ evaluating the quality of non-GAAP 
reporting, with these quality assessments ultimately affecting their assessments of 







5.1 Design, Procedures and Participants 
To test the effects of non-GAAP labels and awareness of managerial discretion in 
non-GAAP reporting, I conduct a 2 × 2 between-participants experiment. I manipulate the 
diagnosticity of the label used by the firm and the presence or absence of a prompt 
informing participants about discretion in non-GAAP reporting. As discussed previously, I 
manipulate the diagnosticity of the label via the perceived persistence of non-GAAP 
earnings labeled as “adjusted” or “core.” To manipulate awareness of managerial 
discretion, I provide participants with a brief bulletin from the SEC on non-GAAP 
reporting. This bulletin is designed to provide participants with information that is similar 
to the content of the SEC’s releases on non-GAAP reporting, including explaining that 
there is managerial discretion in both the calculation and labeling of non-GAAP measures 
(e.g., SEC, 2001, 2016). Importantly, I intentionally design the bulletin to have a balanced 
tone, consistent with SEC statements that non-GAAP reporting can be useful, but also 
warning investors that companies have discretion over non-GAAP reporting (see Appendix 
C).   
I recruit MBA students as participants, consistent with the participants used in my 
survey examining the extent to which non-GAAP labels convey persistent performance. As 
my experimental design is based in part on the results of the survey, it is important to use a 
similar population to ensure the non-GAAP labels are perceived in a similar way. Further, 
MBA students are a well-accepted proxy for non-professional investors, and have been 
shown to be appropriate participants in experiments investigating the judgments of non-
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professional investors (Elliott, Hodge, Kennedy and Pronk, 2007). I choose to focus on 
non-professional investors in my study so that my results directly speak to the efficacy of 
the SEC’s efforts to educate non-professional investors. I recruit a total of 120 full-time 
MBA students from a large public university for my study.  
The experiment is operationalized using the Qualtrics online survey platform, but 
administered in a controlled laboratory setting. On arrival, participants are first randomly 
assigned to experimental conditions. Participants in the high awareness condition receive a 
bulletin from the SEC on non-GAAP reporting and a comprehension check question 
related to the bulletin. Participants are required to correctly answer this question before 
proceeding with the experiment. I then provide all participants with a technology firm’s Q4 
earnings release, which includes my manipulation of the non-GAAP label.10 In the 
earnings release, non-GAAP earnings exceed GAAP earnings, and GAAP (non-GAAP) 
earnings are presented as having a growth rate that is equivalent to (greater than) the 
industry average.11  
Below the earnings release is an optional hyperlink to a section titled 
“Supplemental Information,” which opens in a separate window. This design enables me to 
collect data for my first dependent measure: participants’ access of the non-GAAP 
reconciliation. Participants who access the Supplemental Information page observe a 
tabular presentation of the financial results from the main earnings release, and the 
reconciliation of the non-GAAP measure to the most comparable GAAP measure (see 
                                                 
10 I select a technology company as it has been a common industry choice for non-GAAP experiments (e.g. 
Elliott, 2006; Brown et al., 2018). 
11 Firms more commonly report non-GAAP income metrics that exceed GAAP metrics, and are likely to use 
opportunistic disclosures in these cases (see Curtis, McVay and Whipple, 2014 for a discussion). 
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Appendix C). I design the experiment in this way to mimic the effort required to search for 
non-GAAP reconciliations provided in actual earnings releases; that is, I find that less than 
10% of S&P 500 firms present the non-GAAP reconciliation adjacent to the initial 
reporting of the non-GAAP measure.12 On the screen with the earnings release, participants 
respond to dependent measures regarding their willingness to invest, followed by a 
manipulation check and process measures.  
Although the reconciliation from non-GAAP income to GAAP income is held 
constant across conditions, an important part of my experimental design is the selection of 
the reconciling item. The reconciliation shows the firm adds back stock-based 
compensation expense to GAAP income in two consecutive years to arrive at the non-
GAAP income metric. I choose to remove the expense in two consecutive years to be 
consistent with the SEC’s concerns about mislabeling; it is inappropriate to use a persistent 
label when removing a recurring expense from earnings. I choose stock-based 
compensation specifically because it is important for the excluded item in my experiment 
to be plausible so that overall perceptions about the (in)appropriateness of the reconciling 
item do not dominate the effect of label. Archival studies confirm stock-based 
compensation expense is commonly excluded from non-GAAP earnings (Barth, Gow and 
Taylor, 2012; Mohanram, White and Zhao, 2020). 
Because it is possible investor reactions could differ depending on the reconciling 
item, I conduct an out of sample test on Amazon's Mechanical Turk platform in which I 
                                                 
12 In all other cases, investors must search for the reconciliation from non-GAAP to GAAP. In addition, it is 
not always apparent that the measure being reported is a non-GAAP measure, and non-GAAP reconciliations 
are often more complex than the simplified version I use in my experiment.  
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ask participants to rank the appropriateness of a firm adding back several expense items to 
arrive at a “core” income metric. The expense items tested include research and 
development, amortization, income tax and stock-based compensation. These expense 
items were all selected as they are likely to persist across multiple years and were cited in 
SEC comment letters regarding the inappropriate use of the “core” label. This test 
indicated no difference in the appropriateness of these adjusting items (average 
appropriateness was 57.01 on a 101-point scale), suggesting investor responses would not 
differ for any of these common reconciling items. 
5.2 Dependent Measures 
 To test H1, regarding investors’ reconciliation access, I create a binary measure 
where 1 (0) indicates participants did (did not) click the link for supplemental information. 
To test H2, regarding investment willingness, I ask participants two questions about their 
willingness to invest. The first question asks “How attractive is an investment in the Tech 
Company’s stock?” on a scale from 0 to 100 where 0 (100) is labeled “Not at all attractive” 
(“Very attractive”). The second question asks “How likely are you to invest in the Tech 
Company’s stock?” on a scale from 0 to 100 where 0 (100) is labeled “Not at all likely” 
(“Very likely”).13 
 I also collect process measures for use in a mediation analysis. My theoretical 
model predicts two different potential mediators depending on awareness of discretion: 
perceived persistence of non-GAAP earnings and management credibility for participants 
with low and high awareness of managerial discretion, respectively. To measure the 
                                                 
13 Participants also answer a question about a price-earnings multiple for The Tech Company’s common 
stock. As results for this question did not differ across conditions, I do not discuss this measure further.  
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perceived persistence of non-GAAP earnings, participants are separately asked how 
persistent they think the Tech Company’s net income and core/adjusted income are.14 I ask 
participants about both income measures to ensure they are correctly recalling the non-
GAAP measure when answering the question about core/adjusted income.15 Both questions 
are asked on a 101-point scale where 0 (100) is labeled “Not at all persistent” (“Very 
persistent”). To measure management credibility, I ask two questions based on prior 
literature. Specifically, I ask participants how competent and how trustworthy they believe 
the Tech Company’s management is (Koonce and Lipe, 2010; Rennekamp, 2012). Both 
questions are asked on 101-point scales where 0 (100) is labeled “Not at all 
competent/trustworthy” (“Very competent/trustworthy”).16  
5.3 Manipulation Check  
Participants in the high awareness of managerial discretion condition must 
successfully answer a comprehension check question to proceed with the task. As such, I 
do not ask a separate manipulation check question for my awareness manipulation. To 
ensure my manipulation of non-GAAP labels is effective, all participants are asked which 
income measures the firm presented, with “net income and adjusted income” and “net 
                                                 
14 Only the non-GAAP label corresponding to each participant’s condition is included in the question stems.  
15 Results are consistent if I use the difference between the two persistence measures in place of the non-
GAAP persistence measure.  
16 Given I predict investors with high awareness of managerial discretion will consider the appropriateness of 
the non-GAAP label when assessing management credibility, I also ask “How appropriate do you think the 
Tech Company’s use of the label “core/adjusted” for its non-GAAP earnings measure is?” with 0 (100) 
labeled “Not at all appropriate” (“Very appropriate”). Inferences for all tests of management credibility are 
the same if I also include the measure of label appropriateness in the calculation of credibility, or use only the 
measure of label appropriateness on its own. 
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income and core income” as their choices. Ninety-nine percent of experimental participants 
correctly identify the income metrics they viewed.17  
5.4 Reconciliation Access 
H1 predicts that when awareness of managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting 
is low, participants will be less likely to access the non-GAAP to GAAP reconciliation 
when a more diagnostic label is used. In the context of my experiment, this hypothesis 
implies that reconciliation access will be lower when non-GAAP income is labeled as 
“core” compared to “adjusted.” In addition, I predict reconciliation access will not differ 
by label condition when awareness of managerial discretion is high. Participants in my 
study must choose to access a link with supplementary information to view the 
reconciliation. This design choice allows me to track access to the supplemental 
information. I code access with a dummy variable where a value of 1 (0) indicates 
participants do (do not) access the supplementary information.  
Panel A of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for access to supplementary 
information, with statistical tests in Panels B and C. Consistent with my predictions, results 
of a categorical model show a significant interaction between non-GAAP label and 
awareness of managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting (χ2(1)
 = 4.89, p = 0.03).18 A 
graphical depiction of results (presented in Panel B of Figure 3) and simple effects tests 
provide further support for my predictions. When awareness of discretion is low, investors 
                                                 
17 At a construct level, the survey results presented in Chapter 2 confirm the “core” and “adjusted” labels 
differ in perceived persistence.  
18 All statistical tests are two-tailed unless otherwise noted for directional predictions. In cases where I make 
ex ante directional predictions, I use one-tailed statistical tests based on these predictions (Dubey, 2007; 
Ruxton and Neuhauser, 2010; Ludbrook, 2013). 
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are less likely to view the supplementary information section when the firm uses the “core” 
label than when the firm uses the “adjusted” label (χ2(1) = 3.89, p = 0.04). When awareness 
of discretion is high, the non-GAAP label does not significantly influence participants’ 
reconciliation access; I do not observe a significant difference in access for these investors 
when a firm uses the “core” label compared to the “adjusted” label (χ2(1) = 1.35, p = 0.25). 
In sum, these results are consistent with the predictions in H1. 
5.5 Willingness to Invest 
In H2, I predict that when awareness of discretion is low, investors will be more 
willing to invest when a firm uses the “core” label relative to the “adjusted” label. When 
awareness of discretion is high, I predict the opposite: lower willingness to invest when a 
firm uses the “core” label relative to the “adjusted” label. Panel A of Table 4 presents 
descriptive statistics for willingness to invest, with statistical tests in Panels B and C. 
Consistent with my predictions, I find a significant interaction between non-GAAP label 
and awareness of discretion in non-GAAP reporting for measures of investment 
attractiveness (F1,116 = 6.52, p = 0.01), and investment likelihood (F1,116 = 5.28, p = 0.02). 
As results for the two measures are similar, I confirm the internal reliability of the two 
measures (α = 0.82), and combine the measures using an arithmetic average in further 
discussions.  
Graphical depictions of my results, presented in Figure 3, Panel B, are also 
consistent with my predictions. When awareness of managerial discretion is low, investors 
are more willing to invest when the firm uses the “core” label. When awareness is high, 
investors are less willing to invest when the firm uses the “core” label. Simple effects tests, 
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presented in Panel C of Table 4, further support my predictions. The effect of non-GAAP 
label on average willingness to invest is marginally significant when awareness is low (t116 
= 1.38, p = 0.09, one-tailed), and significant when awareness is high (t116 = -2.34, p = 0.01, 
one-tailed).  
 These results support my predictions. When awareness of managerial discretion in 
non-GAAP reporting is low and non-GAAP earnings exceed GAAP, investors are more 
willing to invest when a firm uses a more diagnostic label implying persistence even in the 
presence of a less persistent calculation of non-GAAP earnings. When awareness of 
managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting is high and non-GAAP earnings exceed 
GAAP, investors are less willing to invest when a firm uses a more diagnostic non-GAAP 
label implying persistence in conjunction with a less persistent measure of earnings.  
5.6 A Note on Measurement-of-Mediation 
The next section discusses the results of a mediation analysis as a test of my 
theoretical model. The measurement of psychological processes in the same experiment as 
the relationship between the independent and dependent variable is subject to several 
limitations, including (1) the potential contamination of the dependent and/or mediator 
variable, (2) unpredicted interactions between the independent variables and the mediators 
(3) the correlational nature of these tests, (4) lack of theoretical distinction between 
mediators and dependent variables, and (5) low power, (e.g. Spencer, Zanna and Fong, 
2005).  
I attempt to overcome these limitations in several ways. First, with regard to the 
potential for contamination of the dependent variable, I measure my proposed 
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psychological processes after my primary dependent measures to avoid creating the 
predicted causal chain by design (Spencer et al., 2005). In addition, I collect data on 
participants’ access to the reconciliation as further evidence of the theoretical process. This 
is a behavioral process measure: it is an unobtrusive measure of participants’ actions in 
determining their investment intentions and is collected without their explicit knowledge 
(Asay et al., 2020). It is therefore unlikely to be contaminated by (or contaminate) the 
primary dependent measures. 
In addition, my theory and experimental design help to alleviate concerns regarding 
unpredicted interactions between the independent variables and the mediators, the 
correlational nature of measurement-of-mediation tests, and the potential for a lack of 
theoretical distinction between mediators and dependent variables. Specifically, my theory 
and hypotheses predict processes that move in opposite directions for different levels of the 
moderator (i.e., awareness of managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting). For 
participants with low levels of awareness of managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting, 
I predict a positive effect of the “core” label relative to the “adjusted” label on investment 
willingness via a positive effect on perceived non-GAAP income persistence. For 
participants with high levels of awareness of managerial discretion in non-GAAP 
reporting, I predict a negative effect of the “core” label relative to the “adjusted” label via a 
negative effect on management credibility. I therefore explicitly predict an interaction 
between my independent variables and mediators. I also collect and simultaneously model 
all process measures for all participants. Because I predict a positive (negative) effect of 
the “core” label for participants with low (high) levels of awareness of managerial 
40 
 
discretion, and model both processes in all conditions, I rule out the possibility that my 
results are driven solely by common-method variance or a lack of theoretical distinction 
between my proposed mediators and dependent variable (Doty and Glick, 1998). Put 
simply, if my results were driven by either of these issues, all links in the model would be 
statistically significant and identically signed for all conditions.   
Last, I predict the relationship between the mediating variables and the dependent 
measure will not significantly differ across conditions. Leveraging prior research, I predict 
a positive relationship between my two mediators (assessments of income persistence and 
assessments of management credibility) and my dependent variable (investment 
willingness) (Ohlson, 1999; Mercer, 2005). This prediction indicates a traditional 
measurement of mediation analysis is appropriate (Spencer et al., 2005). 
5.7 Supplemental Analysis – Theoretical Model 
My theoretical model predicts the path through which non-GAAP labels influence 
investors’ willingness to invest depends on awareness of managerial discretion in non-
GAAP reporting. Specifically, when awareness is low, investors will use peripheral route 
processing to evaluate the non-GAAP metric being reported. This will involve using the 
label or nature of the reconciling items as a heuristic cue. In the case of a diagnostic label 
conveying a persistent measure of income, the perceived persistence of non-GAAP 
earnings will be higher relative to when a less diagnostic non-GAAP label is used, 
resulting in higher willingness to invest. When awareness of discretion is high, investors 
will use central route processing to engage in a deeper evaluation of management’s non-
GAAP reporting strategy. This will involve consideration of the non-GAAP label and 
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reconciliation to assess management credibility when reaching an investment decision. I 
collect additional measures to test this theoretical model, including measures of non-
GAAP income persistence and management credibility. 
Descriptive statistics, ANOVA and simple effects tests for non-GAAP persistence 
and management credibility judgments are presented in Table 5. To directly test the 
validity of my theoretical model, I use the SPSS PROCESS macro Model 8 to 
simultaneously examine these two mediators (Hayes, 2018).19 Figure 4 presents my 
statistical model.20 My dependent variable in the model is the average of the investment 
attractiveness and investment willingness measures. I model perceived non-GAAP 
persistence using investors’ responses to the non-GAAP income persistence question, and 
management credibility using the average of management competence and management 
trustworthiness.  
Consistent with my predictions, the effect of non-GAAP label on perceived non-
GAAP income persistence depends on awareness of managerial discretion in non-GAAP 
reporting. When awareness is low, investors judge non-GAAP income to be more 
persistent when the firm uses the “core” label than when the firm uses the “adjusted” label 
(90% CI [+4.35 , +20.94]) but there is no relationship between label and non-GAAP   
income persistence when awareness is high (90% CI [–6.34 , +9.94]). In addition, the 
                                                 
19 Alternatively, this analysis could be conducted using structural equation modeling (SEM). The primary 
difference between these two methods is that PROCESS tests the model using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions while SEM tests the model using maximum likelihood (ML) regressions. Both methods have 
been shown to generate similar results, and PROCESS is preferred in cases with smaller sample sizes (Hayes 
[2018]).  
20 I do not include participants’ reconciliation access in the model as my predictions about the directional 
effects of the mediating relationships inherently account for my predictions about access. For example, I 
predict access will be lower in the “core” / low awareness condition than the “adjusted” / low awareness 
condition, and that this difference in access is what drives differences in perceived persistence.  
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effect of non-GAAP label on management credibility depends on awareness of managerial 
discretion in non-GAAP reporting. When awareness is high, investors find management to 
be more credible when the firm uses the “adjusted” label (90% CI [–12.46, –0.38), but 
there is no relationship between label and credibility when awareness is low (90%  
CI [–4.05 , +8.23]). Both non-GAAP income persistence and management credibility are 
positively related to willingness to invest (90% CI [+0.08 , +0.32] and [+0.20 , +0.53], 
respectively). Consistent with recent statistical recommendations, I also examine the index 
of moderated mediation (Hayes, 2015). The index of moderated mediation is a test of the 
difference between conditional indirect effects; this test examines if the difference between 
levels of awareness within each causal pathway is significant. The difference between high 
and low awareness for the non-GAAP persistence pathway is marginally significant (p = 
0.07, untabulated), and the difference for the credibility pathway is significant (p = 0.05, 
untabulated). Together, these findings provide support for my proposed theoretical model. 
5.8 Supplemental Analysis – High Awareness of Managerial Discretion  
 I find that when awareness of managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting is 
high, investors are more willing to invest when a firm uses the “adjusted” non-GAAP label 
relative to the “core” non-GAAP label. As noted in my hypothesis development, it is 
possible two separate forces drive this reaction: negative reactions to a firm that 
inappropriately uses a more diagnostic label (in this case, use of the “core” label with a less 
persistent measure of earnings) and/or positive reactions to a firm that uses a less 
diagnostic and therefore more transparent label (in this case, use of the “adjusted” label to 
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encourage investors to seek additional information). In this section, I provide preliminary 
evidence on which of these forces is at work. 
Because reconciliation access is relatively equal in both “adjusted” conditions (χ2(1) 
= 0.82, p = 0.37), the low awareness / “adjusted” participants serve as a meaningful 
comparison group for the high awareness / “adjusted” participants. Specifically, any 
difference in willingness to invest across these two groups is attributable to the 
manipulation of awareness of discretion, as both label and access to the reconciliation are 
held relatively constant across conditions.21 If willingness to invest in the high awareness / 
“adjusted” condition is significantly greater than in the low awareness / “adjusted” 
condition, this would indicate awareness of managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting 
causes investors to react positively when a firm uses a more transparent label. However, if 
awareness of discretion only causes investors to react negatively to the use of an 
inappropriate label, there would be no effect of awareness of discretion on willingness to 
invest for investors when the “adjusted” label is used.  
Results (presented in Figure 3 and Table 4) show awareness of discretion causes 
investors to react more positively to a firm that uses the “adjusted” label. Specifically, 
when the firm uses the “adjusted” label, investors with high awareness of discretion are 
more willing to invest (average willingness to invest mean = 64.40) than investors with 
low awareness of discretion (mean = 52.05; p ≤ 0.01). This is consistent with investors 
who have high levels of awareness of managerial discretion reacting positively to the 
transparency associated with using a less diagnostic non-GAAP label in this setting. 
                                                 
21 The same comparison cannot be made for the “core” conditions because, consistent with my theory, 
reconciliation access is significantly different across conditions (χ2(1) = 5.00, p = 0.03) 
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As further support for this explanation, I examine differences in management 
credibility across conditions. Investors’ assessments of management credibility are 
significantly greater in the high awareness / “adjusted” condition than in all other 
conditions (all p < 0.05).22 This indicates the use of a less diagnostic label increases 
perceived management credibility resulting in a greater willingness to invest, which is 
consistent with past research suggesting individuals are more likely to trust an adviser 
when the adviser is transparent about conflicting incentives (Cain et al., 2005). Experiment 
Two provides additional evidence on the role of transparency in investors’ reactions to 
non-GAAP labels.  
  
                                                 
22 I note that my research is not able to identify if investors are reacting appropriately to more transparent 





Supplemental analyses for Experiment One suggest awareness of managerial 
discretion in non-GAAP reporting causes investors to react positively to a firm that uses a 
less diagnostic non-GAAP label, likely because they perceive the less diagnostic label as 
reflecting greater transparency. Experiment Two further examines the role of transparency 
in non-GAAP reporting. Specifically, E2 tests if investors’ react favorably to transparency 
in non-GAAP reporting regardless of the non-GAAP label, or if the non-GAAP label plays 
an incremental role. 
6.1 Design, Procedures and Participants 
Experiment Two has a 3 × 1 between-participants design. In this experiment, all 
participants receive the investor bulletin manipulation from E1, giving all participants high 
awareness of discretion in non-GAAP reporting. As in E1, I manipulate the diagnosticity 
of the non-GAAP label using the “core” and “adjusted” labels. Unlike E1, I also include a 
condition in which the firm does not report a non-GAAP measure. This design creates a 
control group to determine whether investors react negatively or positively to firms who 
report non-GAAP earnings using the “core” and “adjusted” labels with a prominent 
reconciliation.23  
After reading the investor bulletin and correctly answering a comprehension check 
question, participants receive the Q4 earnings release from the same technology firm as in 
                                                 
23 To hold information constant, I provide all participants with a detailed income statement that includes the 
non-GAAP reconciling item. 
46 
 
E1. However, unlike E1 where participants must choose to access the reconciliation from 
GAAP income to non-GAAP income, in E2 the reconciliation is prominently presented to 
all participants in the “core” and “adjusted” conditions. Importantly, this design allows me 
to test whether awareness of managerial discretion causes investors to react favorably to 
transparency in non-GAAP reporting regardless of the non-GAAP label, or if the non-
GAAP label is the key determinant of perceived transparency.  Specifically, this design 
tests if investors react positively to firms who report non-GAAP earnings in a transparent 
manner even if the label does not match the persistence of the non-GAAP earnings, or 
alternatively if investors react negatively to firms who mislabel non-GAAP earnings even 
if the calculation of non-GAAP earnings is prominently disclosed.24 If awareness of 
discretion causes investors to react positively to more transparent non-GAAP reporting, 
willingness to invest will be higher in both “core” and “adjusted” conditions than in the 
control condition. On the other hand, if these investors react negatively to firms who 
mislabel non-GAAP earnings regardless of the overall transparency of the non-GAAP 
disclosure package, then willingness to invest will be lower for the “core” label than for the 
“adjusted” label (and potentially also lower than the control condition).  
I again recruit MBA participants for E2. Participants are 82 working professionals 
enrolled in an MBA program at the same highly-rated public university from which E1 
                                                 
24 In E1, high awareness of discretion caused participants to be equally likely to access the reconciliation in 
both label conditions. Thus, providing everyone with the reconciliation in E2 does not change the relative 
information set available to participants in the two non-GAAP label conditions. Additionally, deviating from 
the more common case of non-adjacent reconciliations allows me to compare two types of transparency 
(transparency via label and via reconciliation placement), providing regulators with useful information about 
the potential effects of mandating prominent reconciliations.  
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participants were recruited. Participants are 31 years old on average and have an average of 
eight years of full-time work experience.  
6.2 Results 
Consistent with E1, I collect measures of the attractiveness of an investment in the 
firm, as well as participants’ willingness to invest. I test for the internal reliability of the 
two measures (α = 0.93), and combine the measures using an arithmetic average for my 
main measure of willingness to invest. Panel A of Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for 
willingness to invest, with statistical tests in Panels B and C. The one-way ANOVA in 
Panel B reveals a marginally significant effect of non-GAAP label on average willingness 
to invest (F2,79 = 2.62, p = 0.08). Graphical depictions of my results, presented in Figure 5, 
further clarify the pattern of results.  
Compared to the control condition in which the firm does not report non-GAAP 
income, I find willingness to invest is greater when the firm reports non-GAAP income 
using either the “adjusted” or the “core” label (both p < 0.06). I also find willingness to 
invest does not differ across non-GAAP labels when the reconciliation is made more 
transparent (t79 = 0.23, p = 0.82). This pattern of results supports the explanation that 
awareness of managerial discretion causes investors to react positively to more transparent 
non-GAAP disclosures, regardless of label. Considered together with the results of 
Experiment One, it appears awareness of managerial discretion causes investors to value 
transparency in non-GAAP disclosures as a whole, and to react negatively only to firms 
who mislabel non-GAAP earnings when they perceive that the firm is trying to obfuscate. 
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Measures of the non-GAAP labels’ appropriateness and forthcomingness also 
support the explanation that investors who have read regulatory guidance value overall 
transparency in non-GAAP reporting. I find no significant difference between investors’ 
perceptions of the “core” and “adjusted” labels’ appropriateness or forthcomingness in E2 
(t81 = -0.81, p = 0.42 and t81 = -1.40, p = 0.17). When compared to the results of E1, in 
which judgments of the appropriateness between the two labels did differ, this suggests the 
“core” label is viewed as inappropriate in E1 because it is viewed as an attempt to mislead. 
In E2 however, greater transparency in the overall disclosure package means investors 
place less emphasis on the non-GAAP label specifically.25 
Across both experiments, I find little evidence that investors who are aware of 
discretion in non-GAAP reporting react negatively to the “core” label. One explanation for 
this somewhat surprising result is my use of stock-based compensation as the expense item 
excluded from non-GAAP earnings in my experimental materials. Stock-based 
compensation is among the most commonly excluded expense items in non-GAAP 
earnings, and is often (inappropriately) ignored in valuation, even among professional 
analysts (Mohanram, White and Zhao, 2020). Therefore, excluding stock-based 
compensation from “core” earnings is unlikely to be punished by non-professional 
investors, even when it is excluded in multiple years. 
Taken together with the results of E1, these findings indicate awareness of 
managerial discretion causes investors to react positively to firms who use more 
                                                 
25 These findings also serve to alleviate concerns about demand effects related to my awareness 
manipulation. Specifically, if mention of labels as one avenue of discretion in the awareness manipulation 
caused differences in E1 due to a demand effect, labels should cause a difference in E2 as well.  
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transparent non-GAAP reporting practices. In a result that may be somewhat 
counterintuitive, this includes less diagnostic labeling that encourages investors to seek out 
additional non-GAAP information. E2 suggests that investors with higher awareness of 
managerial discretion also react favorably to non-GAAP earnings, regardless of label, 
when they are paired with more prominent disclosure of the reconciliation from non-
GAAP income to GAAP income. These findings are consistent with prior experimental 
research on non-GAAP reporting, which demonstrates more sophisticated investors are 
more likely to rely on non-GAAP reporting when a reconciliation from non-GAAP income 
to GAAP income is displayed (Elliott, 2006). My findings provide preliminary evidence 






In this study, I provide initial evidence on how the labeling of non-GAAP metrics 
influences non-professional investors’ judgment and decision-making. I examine how non-
GAAP labels affect investors’ information processing and willingness to invest when their 
awareness of managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting is both high and low, 
providing evidence on the importance of non-GAAP labels. I find that when awareness of 
discretion is low, investors are less likely to access the reconciliation from non-GAAP to 
GAAP income when the firm uses a more diagnostic label, specifically one that implies 
persistent non-GAAP earnings. This finding validates regulators’ concerns about the 
potential for non-GAAP labels to mislead investors. I further find that when awareness of 
managerial discretion is low, investors are more willing to invest when non-GAAP 
earnings are labeled as “core” rather than “adjusted.” Consistent with my theoretical 
predictions, this effect results from these investors using the non-GAAP label as a heuristic 
cue to assess the persistence of the non-GAAP measure when determining its effect on 
firm value. These findings provide evidence on one mechanism through which non-GAAP 
labels can affect investor judgments.  
On the other hand, when awareness of discretion is high, I find no difference in 
investors’ access of the non-GAAP to GAAP reconciliation. This finding is informative to 
regulators, as it provides evidence that efforts to educate investors about non-GAAP 
reporting are quite effective for those investors that read them. Beyond regulatory efforts, 
investors’ awareness of managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting may also be 
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increased by other factors, such as media attention or general investor sophistication. I also 
find that when awareness is high, investors are more willing to invest when non-GAAP 
earnings are labeled as “adjusted” rather than “core.” Supplemental tests indicate this 
finding is consistent with investors using central route processing to engage in a deeper 
analysis of the non-GAAP measure. This includes considering both the non-GAAP label 
and non-GAAP reconciling items, and I find that investors with high awareness of 
discretion react positively to firms that report in a more transparent way by using a less 
diagnostic non-GAAP label. The value these investors place on transparent disclosures is 
confirmed in a second experiment, where I find investors with high awareness of discretion 
in non-GAAP reporting react positively when firms report higher non-GAAP income 
measures, regardless of label, as long as the firm is transparent in its non-GAAP reporting. 
This finding is informative to managers, who rarely present the non-GAAP reconciliation 
adjacent to the non-GAAP measure in practice, and are often criticized for a lack of 
transparency in non-GAAP reporting. In addition, these results suggest a more prominent 
reconciliation serves to undo the effect of labeling on investors’ judgments, indicating 
mandating reconciliation prominence is a potential solution to misleading non-GAAP 
labels.  
My findings are not without limitations. I focus on non-GAAP income measures, 
and specifically on the common setting where non-GAAP income is more positive than 
GAAP income. Future research could examine the role of non-GAAP labels with other 
non-GAAP measures, such as top-line revenues, as well as (less common) situations in 
which non-GAAP income is lower than GAAP income. In addition, I test the effect of non-
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GAAP labels in the presence of a particular reconciling item (stock-based compensation 
expense). While an out-of-sample test indicates no difference in investors’ perceptions of 
the appropriateness of several common reconciling items, it is possible reactions to non-
GAAP labels could differ depending on the reconciling item used. Further, although the 
theoretical model I test is quite general, I operationalize differences in label diagnosticity 
with two labels (“core” and “adjusted”) that differ in the extent to which they communicate 
persistent performance. Future research could examine the effects of other attributes of 
non-GAAP labels, such as familiarity or formality. Last, I examine the moderating effect 
of awareness of managerial discretion in non-GAAP reporting via an investor bulletin. 
Future research could examine other methods of increasing awareness of discretion, 
including media reports. Research could also test if my findings for high awareness 
investors generalize to more sophisticated investors, analysts, or other financial statement 
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2001: Cautionary Advice 
Regarding the Use of Pro 
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Information in Earnings 
Releases 
2002: First SEC case related 
to pro forma, SOX passed 
with provision for regulating 
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passed, Regulation S-K 
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2010: Non-GAAP C&DI, 
Non-GAAP “fraud risk 
factor” 
2013: SEC to scrutinize 
non-GAAP that is 
misleading due to 
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2015: Speeches from SEC, FASB, 
IASB discussing concerns related 
to non-GAAP reporting 
2016-8: New Non-GAAP 
C&DI issued and 
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Figure 1, continued 
 












Panel A presents a timeline of key regulatory events related to non-GAAP reporting. The SEC initially raised concern about the potential for non-GAAP 
measures to be misleading to investors in 2001. Following a seven-year gap, the SEC began once again to express concerns about non-GAAP reporting.  
Panel B presents a figure depicting investors’ perceptions of the persistence of non-GAAP earnings with twelve labels used in practice. The label least associated 













































Figure 2 presents a graphical depiction of my theoretical model. Specifically, I predict when awareness of managerial discretion is low, investors will use 
peripheral route processing to evaluate the persistence of non-GAAP income via the non-GAAP label, which will ultimately affect their assessments of firm 
value. When awareness of managerial discretion is high, investors will utilize central route processing. This will involve considering the non-GAAP 
reconciliation and the non-GAAP label to arrive at their assessment of firm value via an assessment of management’s credibility.
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Graphed Predictions and Results 
 
Panel A: Predictions 
 
  
Panel B: Results  
     
Figure 3 presents graphical depictions of my predictions and results for my primary dependent measures in 
Experiment One.  
Access supplementary information: 0/1 coding for participant accessed (1) or did not access (0) the supplementary 
info with the reconciliation of non-GAAP income to GAAP income 
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Figure 4 presents my process model, which was tested using SPSS PROCESS Model 8 (Hayes [2018]). Consistent with my predictions, I find perceived non-
GAAP persistence mediates judgments of firm value for investors with low awareness of managerial discretion, and management credibility mediates judgments 





0 = Adjusted 
1 = Core 
 










Low awareness of discretion  
+2.45 ,  p = 0.52 
 
High awareness of discretion 




Low awareness of discretion 
+12.65 ,  p < 0.01† 
 
High awareness of discretion 




+0.20 ,  p < 0.01 
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+2.09  ,  p = 0.57 
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Experiment 2: Primary Dependent Measures Graphed Results 
 
    
 
Figure 5 presents graphical depictions of results for my primary dependent measures in Experiment Two.  
Investment attractiveness: How attractive is an investment in the Tech Company’s stock?  (0=not at all attractive, 100=very attractive) 
Investment likelihood: How likely are you to invest in the Tech Company’s stock? (0= not at all likely, 100= very likely) 



































































Frequency and Perceived Persistence of Non-GAAP Labels in Practice 
 
Term Number of times used Perceived persistence 
Adjusted 246 -19.84 
Non-GAAP 118 -5.29 
Operating 41 30.00 
Constant Currency 39 18.84 
Core 23 31.03 
Organic 21 14.38 
Comparable 18 -2.99 
Underlying 5 9.06 
Same-store 4 11.81 
Ongoing 4 42.84 
Normalized 3 0.46 
Pro forma 3 0.19 
Other 24  
No Non-GAAP metric  79  
 
Table 1 provides the total number of S&P 500 firms that used each term to label their 2016 Q4 earnings metrics, as 
well as details from my survey of investor perceptions of non-GAAP labels.  
 
The ‘other’ category includes the industry specific term “FFO,” as well as labels that were used by only one firm, 
including: “managed,” “guidance basis,” “historical basis,” “economic,” “before changes/gains,” “modified,” and 
several tax-related labels. Some firms used more than one label; as such, the total is greater than 500.  
 
In the survey, participants were asked to assess the extent to which each label conveyed persistence on a 101-point 






Experiment 1: Predictions and Results 
 
 Prediction Finding Supported? 
Reconciliation Access 
Low Awareness of Discretion Persistent < Not persistent “Core” < “Adjusted” Yes 
High Awareness of Discretion Persistent = Not persistent “Core” = “Adjusted” Yes 
Willingness to Invest 
Low Awareness of Discretion Persistent > Not persistent “Core” > “Adjusted” Yes 
High Awareness of Discretion Persistent < Not persistent “Core” < “Adjusted” Yes 
Non-GAAP Income Persistence 
Low Awareness of Discretion Persistent > Not persistent “Core” > “Adjusted” Yes 
Management Credibility 









Experiment 1: Access Supplementary Information  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics—Mean for access of supplementary information 
 Access supplementary information 
 Core Adjusted 
















Panel B: Categorical model  
 Access supplementary information 
 𝛘2 p-value 
Non-GAAP label 0.40 0.53 
Awareness of discretion 0.93 0.34 
Label × Awareness 4.89 0.03 
 
Panel C: Simple main effects tests 
 Access supplementary information 
 𝛘2 p-value 
Label given high awareness  1.35 0.25 
Label given low awareness 3.89 0.04 
Awareness given “core”  5.00 0.03 
Awareness given “adjusted”  0.82 0.37 
 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for reconciliation access where 0 (1) indicates a participant did not (did) 
access the supplementary information including the reconciliation from GAAP income to non-GAAP income. Panel 





Experiment 1: Willingness to Invest 
 








 Core Adjusted Core Adjusted Core Adjusted 




































































 F-stat p-value F-stat p-value F-stat p-value 
Non-GAAP label 0.62 0.43 0.20 0.65 0.43 0.51 
Awareness of discretion 2.09 0.15 2.24 0.14 2.56 0.11 
Label × Awareness 6.52 0.01 5.28 0.02 3.30 0.01 
 








 t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
Label given high 
awareness 
-2.38 0.01† -1.96 0.03† -2.34 0.01† 
Label given low 
awareness 
1.24 0.11† 1.30 0.10† 1.38 0.09† 
Awareness given 
“core”  
-0.79 0.43 -0.57 0.57 -0.73 0.47 
Awareness given 
“adjusted”  
2.81 0.01 2.67 0.01 2.97 <0.01 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for willingness to invest measures, measured on 101-point scales. Panel B 




Experiment 1: Process Measures 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics—Mean (std dev) for process measures 
 Non-GAAP persistence Management credibility 
 Core Adjusted Core Adjusted 










































Panel B: Analysis of variance 
 Non-GAAP persistence Management credibility 
 F-stat p-value F-stat p-value 
Non-GAAP label 4.23 0.04 4.38 0.04 
Awareness of 
discretion 
1.12 0.29 0.69 0.41 
Label × Awareness 2.40 0.12 2.68 0.10 
 
Panel C: Simple Main Effects Tests 
 Non-GAAP persistence Management credibility 
 t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
Label given high 
awareness 
0.36 0.72 3.10 0.04† 
Label given low 
awareness 
2.53 <0.01† 0.32 0.57 
Awareness given 
“core”  
-0.35 0.73 0.11 0.75 
Awareness given 
“adjusted”  
1.83 0.07 6.84 0.01 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for process measures. Panel B provides ANOVA’s, with simple main effects 




Experiment 2: Willingness to Invest 
 
























































to invest  
 F-stat p-value F-stat p-value F-stat p-value 
Non-GAAP label 2.91 0.06 2.17 0.12 2.62 0.08 
 








 t-stat p-value t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
“Core” versus 
“Adjusted” 
0.10 0.92 0.49 0.62 0.23 0.82 
“Core” versus no non-
GAAP  
2.01 0.05 1.99 0.05 2.07 0.04 
“Adjusted” versus no 
non-GAAP  
2.16 0.03 1.54 0.13 1.89 0.06 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for willingness to invest measures, measured on 101-point scales. 




Non-GAAP Label Examples  
 
Panel A: Fidelity Information Services 2016 Q4 Earnings Release Abstract – “Adjusted” 
Label 
  




Notes: FIS and Alliance Data designate one another as key competitors in their 10K and share the 





SEC Comment Letter Examples 
 
Electronics for Imaging Inc, 2009: We also note your reference to core operating results 
in your discussion of non-GAAP disclosures. If you intend to use this terminology in your 
future filings ensure that it is adequately defined and that you have fully explained how 
you determine that the excluded items are not representative of your core operations.  
 
Dime Community Bancshares, 2010: The title of core earnings does not appear 
appropriate in light of the fact that most of the adjustments you are making to exclude from 
core earnings are directly related to the on-going operations of a bank…Please revise your 
title accordingly to more accurately reflect the nature of this measure.  
 
Dow Chemical, 2011: It appears to us that your titles of these non-GAAP measures are 
potentially confusing and that your current footnote designation is not transparent. Please 
appropriately title each non-GAAP measure so that the title clearly and adequately conveys 
what the measure actually represents.  
 
BJ’s Restaurants Inc, 2011: For greater clarity please revise the titles of your non-GAAP 
financial measures from non-GAAP net income and non-GAAP basic net income per share 
to adjusted net income or non-GAAP adjusted net income.  
 
Bancorp, Inc 2011: Please revise your future filings to change the name of your non-
GAAP measure to more accurately reflect its content…we believe it would be appropriate 









Non-GAAP Primary Experiment MBA 
 
Please enter your participant number as it appears on your welcome sheet. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
  Note: Participants were randomly assigned a 
number at the start of the experiment. This 
number was used to track participant access 




Thank you for participating in this study. The purpose of the study is to examine how 
individuals make investment judgments and decisions. Your participation today will take 
approximately 10 minutes. The information included in the case is not intended to be 
completely representative of what would normally be available when you evaluate a 
company. Providing you with that level of detail would require more time to complete the 
case than could realistically be expected. Please make the best judgments you can based on 
the information provided in these materials.  
When you have completed the study, copy down your completion code and exit the room 
to receive your payment.  
 
 





As an investor, you read the following bulletin from the SEC: 
 
Non-GAAP earnings are measures that include or exclude amounts that earnings presented 
under US GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) do not. 
 
Non-GAAP earnings can provide useful information about company performance. 
However, companies have substantial discretion over non-GAAP earnings. In 
particular:       
 There is considerable variation in the way non-GAAP earnings are calculated.        
 There is considerable variation in the labeling of non-GAAP measures.  
 
Which of the following is true about non-GAAP earnings? Select all that apply. 
▢  There is considerable variation in the calculation and labeling of non-GAAP 
earnings.  
▢  Manager's have no discretion in the calculation of non-GAAP earnings.  
▢  Non-GAAP earnings measures deviate from US GAAP (Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles).  
▢  Non-GAAP measures are never useful.  
 
 
Page Break  
  
 Note: Participants were required to 
correctly answer this question before 
moving forward. 




Assume that the year 2XX2 has just ended, and you are considering investing in The 




The Tech Company announces net income growth of 5% and core income growth of 
9% in 2XX2. 
The Tech Company today announced the following 2XX2 year end results:     
 Net income: up 5% to $510 million, diluted earnings per share $0.39   
 Core income: up 9% to $650 million, core earnings per share $0.50   
“The Tech Company is seeing significant growth as represented by our core income 
results, and we’re well positioned to reach new opportunities in the year ahead” said John 
Smith, chief executive officer at The Tech Company.   
 




You also learn that most other firms in this industry had an earnings growth rate for 
2XX2 of 5%. 
Based on this information, respond to the following questions.  
 
 
How attractive is an investment in the Tech Company’s stock? 
 Not at all attractive Very attractive 
 






How likely are you to invest in the Tech Company’s stock?  
 Not at all likely Very likely 
 






Note: “Supplemental Information” linked to a new tab. Information 






To determine a fair price for The Tech Company’s shares, you think about what The Tech 
Company's price-earnings (P/E) multiple should be. A lower multiple means you wouldn’t 
be willing to pay much for each dollar of earnings, and a higher multiple means you would 
be willing to pay more for each dollar of earnings. In other words, the higher the multiple, 
the higher you value The Tech Company's shares.  In determining the P/E multiple for The 
Tech Company, assume that the industry average is 20, and most other firms in this 
industry trade at multiples between 10 and 30 times earnings.   Provide your P/E 
multiple for The Tech Company using the slider below.  
     
 







Page Break  
 
Which income metrics did The Tech Company present? 
o Net income and adjusted income  
o Net income and core income  
 
 
Page Break  
 






How persistent do you think The Tech Company’s net income is? 
 Not at all persistent Very persistent 
 








How persistent do you think The Tech Company’s core income is? 
 Not at all persistent Very persistent 
 







Page Break  
 
How appropriate do you think The Tech Company’s use of the label "core" for its 
non-GAAP earnings measure is? 
 Not at all appropriate Very appropriate 
 







How competent do you think The Tech Company’s management is?  
 Not at all competent Very competent 
 










How trustworthy do you think The Tech Company’s management is?  
 Not at all trustworthy Very trustworthy 
 









Assume that the year 2XX2 has just ended, and you are considering investing in The 




The Tech Company announces net income growth of 5% and adjusted income 
growth of 9% in 2XX2. 
The Tech Company today announced the following 2XX2 year end results:     
 Net income: up 5% to $510 million, diluted earnings per share $0.39   
 Adjusted income: up 9% to $650 million, adjusted earnings per share $0.50   
“The Tech Company is seeing significant growth as represented by our adjusted income 
results, and we’re well positioned to reach new opportunities in the year ahead” said John 
Smith, chief executive officer at The Tech Company.   
 




You also learn that most other firms in this industry had an earnings growth rate for 
2XX2 of 5%. 
Based on this information, respond to the following questions.  
 
 
How attractive is an investment in the Tech Company’s stock? 
 Not at all attractive Very attractive 
 









Note: “Supplemental Information” linked to a new tab. Information 
included in this new is presented later in the materials. 
75 
 
How likely are you to invest in the Tech Company’s stock?  
 Not at all likely Very likely 
 







To determine a fair price for The Tech Company’s shares, you think about what The Tech 
Company's price-earnings (P/E) multiple should be. A lower multiple means you wouldn’t 
be willing to pay much for each dollar of earnings, and a higher multiple means you would 
be willing to pay more for each dollar of earnings. In other words, the higher the multiple, 
the higher you value The Tech Company's shares.  In determining the P/E multiple for The 
Tech Company, assume that the industry average is 20, and most other firms in this 
industry trade at multiples between 10 and 30 times earnings.   Provide your P/E 
multiple for The Tech Company using the slider below.  
     
 





Page Break  
 
Which income metrics did The Tech Company present? 
o Net income and adjusted income  
o Net income and core income  
 
 
Page Break  






How persistent do you think The Tech Company’s net income is? 
 Not at all persistent Very persistent 
 








How persistent do you think The Tech Company’s adjusted income is? 
 Not at all persistent Very persistent 
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How appropriate do you think The Tech Company’s use of the label "adjusted" for 
its non-GAAP earnings measure is? 
 Not at all appropriate Very appropriate 
 








How competent do you think The Tech Company’s management is?  
 Not at all competent Very competent 
 









How trustworthy do you think The Tech Company’s management is?  
 Not at all trustworthy Very trustworthy 
 













Start of Block: Default Question Block 
 




Page Break  
  
Note: Participants were randomly assigned a number at 
the start of the experiment. This number was entered at 
the start of the experiment and upon clicking the 
“Supplemental Information” link to track access of the 
non-GAAP reconciliation.  




Click the buttons to view the Tables.  
o Table 1  
o Table 2  
 
 
Display This Question: 





Display This Question: 










Non-GAAP - supplemental info 
ADJUSTED - MBA 
 
 
Start of Block: Default Question Block 
 




Page Break  
  




Click the buttons to view the Tables.  
o Table 1  
o Table 2  
 
 
Display This Question: 





Display This Question: 










Non-GAAP E2 MBA 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. The purpose of the study is to examine how 
individuals make investment judgments and decisions. Your participation today will take 
approximately 10 minutes. The information included in the case is not intended to be 
completely representative of what would normally be available when you evaluate a 
company. Providing you with that level of detail would require more time to complete the 
case than could realistically be expected. Please make the best judgments you can based on 










As an investor, you read the following bulletin from the SEC: 
Non-GAAP earnings are measures that include or exclude amounts that earnings presented 
under US GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) do not. 
Non-GAAP earnings can provide useful information about company performance. 
However, companies have substantial discretion over non-GAAP earnings. In particular:      
 There is considerable variation in the way non-GAAP earnings are calculated.        




Which of the following is true about non-GAAP earnings? Select all that apply. 
▢  There is considerable variation in the calculation and labeling of non-GAAP 
earnings.  
▢  Manager's have no discretion in the calculation of non-GAAP earnings.  
▢  Non-GAAP earnings measures deviate from US GAAP (Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles).  
▢  Non-GAAP measures are never useful.  
 
 
Page Break  
  
Note: Participants were required to 
correctly answer this question before 
moving forward. 




Assume that the year 2XX2 has just ended, and you are considering investing in The 




The Tech Company announces net income growth of 5% and core income growth of 
9% in 2XX2. 
The Tech Company today announced the following 2XX2 year end results:     
 Net income: up 5% to $510 million, diluted earnings per share $0.39   
 Core income: up 9% to $650 million, core earnings per share $0.50  
“The Tech Company is seeing significant growth as represented by our core income 
results, and we’re well positioned to reach new opportunities in the year ahead” said John 












You also learn that most other firms in this industry had an earnings growth rate for 
2XX2 of 5%. 




How attractive is an investment in the Tech Company’s stock? 
 Not at all attractive Very attractive 
 








How likely are you to invest in the Tech Company’s stock?  
 Not at all likely Very likely 
 










Page Break  
THE CASE INFORMATION IS REPEATED BELOW FOR YOUR REFERENCE. 
 
 
The Tech Company announces net income growth of 5% and core income growth of 
9% in 2XX2. 
The Tech Company today announced the following 2XX2 year end results:     
 Net income: up 5% to $510 million, diluted earnings per share $0.39   
 Core income: up 9% to $650 million, core earnings per share $0.50  
“The Tech Company is seeing significant growth as represented by our core income 
results, and we’re well positioned to reach new opportunities in the year ahead” said John 








How appropriate do you think The Tech Company’s use of the label "core" for its 
non-GAAP earnings measure is? 
 Not at all appropriate Very appropriate 
 








How forthcoming do you think The Tech Company’s use of the label "core" for its 
non-GAAP earnings measure is? 
 Not at all forthcoming Very forthcoming 
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Which income metrics did The Tech Company present? 
o Net income and adjusted income  
o Net income and core income  








Assume that the year 2XX2 has just ended, and you are considering investing in The 




The Tech Company announces net income growth of 5% in 2XX2. 
The Tech Company today announced the following 2XX2 year end results:     
 Net income: up 5% to $510 million, diluted earnings per share $0.39   
“The Tech Company is seeing significant growth, and we’re well positioned to reach new 
opportunities in the year ahead” said John Smith, chief executive officer at The Tech 








You also learn that most other firms in this industry had an earnings growth rate for 
2XX2 of 5%, and that The Tech Company does not report a non-GAAP earnings 








How attractive is an investment in the Tech Company’s stock? 
 Not at all attractive Very attractive 
 








How likely are you to invest in the Tech Company’s stock?  
 Not at all likely Very likely 
 





Page Break  
 
Which income metrics did The Tech Company present? 
o Net income and adjusted income  
o Net income and core income  







Assume that the year 2XX2 has just ended, and you are considering investing in The 




The Tech Company announces net income growth of 5% and adjusted income 
growth of 9% in 2XX2. 
The Tech Company today announced the following 2XX2 year end results:     
 Net income: up 5% to $510 million, diluted earnings per share $0.39   
 Adjusted income: up 9% to $650 million, core earnings per share $0.50   
“The Tech Company is seeing significant growth as represented by our adjusted income 
results, and we’re well positioned to reach new opportunities in the year ahead” said John 











You also learn that most other firms in this industry had an earnings growth rate for 
2XX2 of 5%. 




How attractive is an investment in the Tech Company’s stock? 
 Not at all attractive Very attractive 
 








How likely are you to invest in the Tech Company’s stock?  
 Not at all likely Very likely 
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The Tech Company announces net income growth of 5% and adjusted income 
growth of 9% in 2XX2. 
The Tech Company today announced the following 2XX2 year end results:     
 Net income: up 5% to $510 million, diluted earnings per share $0.39   
 Adjusted income: up 9% to $650 million, core earnings per share $0.50   
“The Tech Company is seeing significant growth as represented by our adjusted income 
results, and we’re well positioned to reach new opportunities in the year ahead” said John 









How appropriate do you think The Tech Company’s use of the label "adjusted" for 
its non-GAAP earnings measure is? 
 Not at all appropriate Very appropriate 
 








How forthcoming do you think The Tech Company’s use of the label "adjusted" for 
its non-GAAP earnings measure is? 
 Not at all forthcoming Very forthcoming 
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Which income metrics did The Tech Company present? 
o Net income and adjusted income  
o Net income and core income  





Non-GAAP Labels similarity MBA 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. The purpose of the study is to examine how 
individuals make investment judgments and decisions. Your participation today will take 
approximately 20 minutes. 
 
Upon completion, you will receive a code to send to your instructor to receive extra credit. 
 
 
In this section, you will be asked to compare pairs of words and determine how similar you 





Thoughtful  :   Helpful 





For this pair, you would likely judge the words to be very similar, and drag the slider to the 
right to indicate that the words are "Very similar". 
 
Now, consider the following pair being used to describe an individual. 
 
Friendly   :   Clumsy 





For this pair, you would likely judge the words to be not similar, and drag the slider to the 
right to indicate that the words are "Not at all similar". 
 
 




Note: The order of terms was randomized (both 
which term came first in the pair, and the order 
of the pairs).  
SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS: LABEL PERCEPTIONS 
95 
 
Following are several pairs of words that are used to describe earnings per share numbers 
by firms in 2016 earnings releases. For example, the word might be used in any of the 
following contexts or more:  
 <<INSERT TERM>> EPS growth to $1.28 
 <<INSERT TERM>> EPS was up 14% to $1.28 
 EPS (<<INSERT TERM>>) for the year was $1.28 
 
For each pair of words, rate how similar you feel the two words are.  
Same-store  :  Underlying 




Recurring  :  Underlying 




Pro forma  :  Underlying 




Organic  :  Underlying 




Operating  :  Underlying 




Non-GAAP  :  Underlying 










The following joke is provided as a break from the task. Word pairs will resume on the 





















The directions are repeated below for your reference. 
 
Following are several pairs of words that are used to describe earnings per share numbers 
by firms in 2016 earnings releases. For example, the word might be used in any of the 
following contexts or more:  
 <<INSERT TERM>> EPS growth to $1.28 
 <<INSERT TERM>> EPS was up 14% to $1.28 
 EPS (<<INSERT TERM>>) for the year was $1.28 
 
For each pair of words, rate how similar you feel the two words are.  
Ongoing  :  Underlying 




Normalized  :  Underlying 




Core  :  Underlying 




Constant currency  :  Underlying 




Comparable  :  Underlying 




Adjusted  :  Underlying 









The following joke is provided as a break from the task. Word pairs will resume on the 






















The directions are repeated below for your reference. 
 
Following are several pairs of words that are used to describe earnings per share numbers 
by firms in 2016 earnings releases. For example, the word might be used in any of the 
following contexts or more:  
 <<INSERT TERM>> EPS growth to $1.28 
 <<INSERT TERM>> EPS was up 14% to $1.28 
 EPS (<<INSERT TERM>>) for the year was $1.28 
 
For each pair of words, rate how similar you feel the two words are.  
Recurring  :  Same-store 




Pro forma  :  Same-store 




Organic  :  Same-store 




Operating  :  Same-store 




Non-GAAP  :  Same-store 




Ongoing  :  Same-store 










The following joke is provided as a break from the task. Word pairs will resume on the 






















The directions are repeated below for your reference. 
 
Following are several pairs of words that are used to describe earnings per share numbers 
by firms in 2016 earnings releases. For example, the word might be used in any of the 
following contexts or more:  
 <<INSERT TERM>> EPS growth to $1.28 
 <<INSERT TERM>> EPS was up 14% to $1.28 
 EPS (<<INSERT TERM>>) for the year was $1.28 
 
For each pair of words, rate how similar you feel the two words are.  
Normalized  :  Same-store 




Core  :  Same-store 




Constant currency  :  Same-store 




Comparable  :  Same-store 




Adjusted  :  Same-store 




Pro forma  :  Recurring 








The following joke is provided as a break from the task. Word pairs will resume on the 
following page.  
 
 


















The directions are repeated below for your reference. 
 
Following are several pairs of words that are used to describe earnings per share numbers 
by firms in 2016 earnings releases. For example, the word might be used in any of the 
following contexts or more:  
 <<INSERT TERM>> EPS growth to $1.28 
 <<INSERT TERM>> EPS was up 14% to $1.28 
 EPS (<<INSERT TERM>>) for the year was $1.28 
For each pair of words, rate how similar you feel the two words are.  
Operating  :  Recurring 




Organic  :  Recurring 




Non-GAAP  :  Recurring 




Ongoing  :  Recurring 




Normalized  :  Recurring 




Core  :  Recurring 








The following joke is provided as a break from the task. Word pairs will resume on the 
following page.  
 
 




















The directions are repeated below for your reference. 
 
Following are several pairs of words that are used to describe earnings per share numbers 
by firms in 2016 earnings releases. For example, the word might be used in any of the 
following contexts or more:  
 <<INSERT TERM>> EPS growth to $1.28 
 <<INSERT TERM>> EPS was up 14% to $1.28 
 EPS (<<INSERT TERM>>) for the year was $1.28 
For each pair of words, rate how similar you feel the two words are.  
Constant currency  :  Recurring 




Comparable  :  Recurring 




Adjusted  :  Recurring 




Organic  :  Pro forma 




Operating  :  Pro forma 




Non-GAAP  :  Pro forma 










The following joke is provided as a break from the task. Word pairs will resume on the 























The directions are repeated below for your reference. 
 
Following are several pairs of words that are used to describe earnings per share numbers 
by firms in 2016 earnings releases. For example, the word might be used in any of the 
following contexts or more:  
 <<INSERT TERM>> EPS growth to $1.28 
 <<INSERT TERM>> EPS was up 14% to $1.28 
 EPS (<<INSERT TERM>>) for the year was $1.28 
For each pair of words, rate how similar you feel the two words are.  
Ongoing  :  Pro forma 




Normalized  :  Pro forma 




Core  :  Pro forma 




Constant currency  :  Pro forma 




Comparable  :  Pro forma 




Adjusted  :  Pro forma 










The following joke is provided as a break from the task. Word pairs will resume on the 














  Progress update: You have completed 7 of 13 pages of comparisons. Over half way done 









The directions are repeated below for your reference. 
 
Following are several pairs of words that are used to describe earnings per share numbers 
by firms in 2016 earnings releases. For example, the word might be used in any of the 
following contexts or more:  
 <<INSERT TERM>> EPS growth to $1.28 
 <<INSERT TERM>> EPS was up 14% to $1.28 
 EPS (<<INSERT TERM>>) for the year was $1.28 
For each pair of words, rate how similar you feel the two words are.  
Operating  :  Organic 




Non-GAAP  :  Organic 




Ongoing  :  Organic 




Normalized  :  Organic 




Core  :  Organic 




Constant currency  :  Organic 










The following joke is provided as a break from the task. Word pairs will resume on the 









 An abdominal snowman  
 
 









The directions are repeated below for your reference. 
 
Following are several pairs of words that are used to describe earnings per share numbers 
by firms in 2016 earnings releases. For example, the word might be used in any of the 
following contexts or more:  
 <<INSERT TERM>> EPS growth to $1.28 
 <<INSERT TERM>> EPS was up 14% to $1.28 
 EPS (<<INSERT TERM>>) for the year was $1.28 
For each pair of words, rate how similar you feel the two words are.  
Comparable  :  Organic 




Adjusted  :  Organic 




Non-GAAP  :  Operating 




Ongoing  :  Operating 




Normalized  :  Operating 




Core  :  Operating 










The following joke is provided as a break from the task. Word pairs will resume on the 






















The directions are repeated below for your reference. 
 
Following are several pairs of words that are used to describe earnings per share numbers 
by firms in 2016 earnings releases. For example, the word might be used in any of the 
following contexts or more:  
 <<INSERT TERM>> EPS growth to $1.28 
 <<INSERT TERM>> EPS was up 14% to $1.28 
 EPS (<<INSERT TERM>>) for the year was $1.28 
For each pair of words, rate how similar you feel the two words are.  
Constant currency  :  Operating 




Comparable  :  Operating 




Adjusted  :  Operating 




Ongoing  :  Non-GAAP 




Normalized  :  Non-GAAP 




Core  :  Non-GAAP 










The following joke is provided as a break from the task. Word pairs will resume on the 
























The directions are repeated below for your reference. 
 
Following are several pairs of words that are used to describe earnings per share numbers 
by firms in 2016 earnings releases. For example, the word might be used in any of the 
following contexts or more:  
 <<INSERT TERM>> EPS growth to $1.28 
 <<INSERT TERM>> EPS was up 14% to $1.28 
 EPS (<<INSERT TERM>>) for the year was $1.28 
For each pair of words, rate how similar you feel the two words are.  
Constant currency  :  Non-GAAP 




Comparable  :  Non-GAAP 




Adjusted  :  Non-GAAP 




Normalized  :  Ongoing 




Core  :  Ongoing 




Constant currency  :  Ongoing 










The following joke is provided as a break from the task. Word pairs will resume on the 























The directions are repeated below for your reference. 
 
Following are several pairs of words that are used to describe earnings per share numbers 
by firms in 2016 earnings releases. For example, the word might be used in any of the 
following contexts or more:  
 <<INSERT TERM>> EPS growth to $1.28 
 <<INSERT TERM>> EPS was up 14% to $1.28 
 EPS (<<INSERT TERM>>) for the year was $1.28 
For each pair of words, rate how similar you feel the two words are.   
Comparable  :  Ongoing 




Adjusted  :  Ongoing 




Core  :  Normalized 




Constant currency  :  Normalized 




Comparable  :  Normalized 




Adjusted  :  Normalized 










The following joke is provided as a break from the task. Word pairs will resume on the 
























The directions are repeated below for your reference. 
 
Following are several pairs of words that are used to describe earnings per share numbers 
by firms in 2016 earnings releases. For example, the word might be used in any of the 
following contexts or more:  
 <<INSERT TERM>> EPS growth to $1.28 
 <<INSERT TERM>> EPS was up 14% to $1.28 
 EPS (<<INSERT TERM>>) for the year was $1.28 
For each pair of words, rate how similar you feel the two words are.  
Constant currency  :  Core 




Comparable  :  Core 




Adjusted  :  Core 




Comparable  :  Constant currency 




Adjusted  :  Constant currency 




Adjusted  :  Comparable 









You've completed the word comparison task - great work!  
 
 
Next, you will work on a rating task. On each page you will be given a dimension on 
which to rate the words used in the comparison task. Consider each word in the same 




End of Block: Factor analysis directions 
 
Start of Block: Factor Analysis Block A 
 
 




























Note: Loop and merge was used to measure each term along the following dimensions: 
- Negative/Positive - Temporary/Ongoing - Unfamiliar/Familiar 
- Unreliable/Reliable - Unofficial/Official  - Simple/Complex 
- Unclear/Clear - Opaque/Transparent - Abstract/Concrete 
- Misleading/Trustworthy 




































































You've completed the rating task - you're almost done! 
 
Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability. Do not use resources to 
look up the correct answer, rather make your best guess for each question.  
Which of the following does not normally have a credit balance?  
o Gain on sale of land  
o Investment income  
o Unearned revenues  
o Rent expense  
Which of the following is not one of the primary financial statements?  
o Income statement  
o Statement of Management Activities  
o Balance Sheet  
o Statement of Stockholders' Equity  
Which of the following would be deducted from revenue to reach net income? 
o Wages payable  
o Prepaid expenses  
o Gross margin  
o Cost of goods sold  
 
Which of the following is a liability?  
o Inventory  
o Cash  
o Accounts payable  
Note: An “accounting test” was included to determine 
if perceptions of labels differed with accounting 
knowledge. No effect of knowledge was found.   
124 
 
o Accounts receivable  
Which of the following would not be reported on the balance sheet? 
o Retained earnings  
o Inventory  
o Accounts payable  
o Cost of goods sold  
 
During 2016, its first year of operations, Redwood Burgers had revenues of $60,000 and 
expenses of $35,000.  The business paid dividends of $20,000.  What is the final balance in 
the retained earnings account at December 31, 2016?  
o $0  
o $25,000  
o $5,000  
o $40,000  
Which of the following is not a section on the statement of cash flows? 
o Financing  
o Investing  
o Managing  





To help us better understand why your responses may differ from those of other 




Please indicate the highest level of education that you have completed.  
o High school  
o Vocational degree  
o Undergraduate degree  
o Master's degree  









Have you ever worked in the following capacities? If yes, fill in the number of years. If no, 
leave blank.  
o Corporate finance ________________________________________________ 
o Corporate accounting ________________________________________________ 
o Public accounting ________________________________________________ 
o Engineering, operation, or other technical position 
________________________________________________ 






Have you ever taken classes in the following areas? If yes, fill in the number of classes. If 
no, leave blank.  
o Accounting ________________________________________________ 
o Finance ________________________________________________ 
o Management ________________________________________________ 
o Information Systems ________________________________________________ 





Non-GAAP appropriateness Mturk 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. The purpose of the study is to examine how 
individuals make investment judgments and decisions. Your participation today will take 
approximately 5 minutes. The information included in the case is not intended to be 
completely representative of what would normally be available when you evaluate a 
company. Providing you with that level of detail would require more time to complete the 
case than could realistically be expected. Please make the best judgments you can based on 
the information provided in these materials. Upon completion, you will receive a code to 
enter on the MTurk website for payment purposes. 
 
 
Page Break  
  




As an investor, you read the following bulletin from the SEC:      
 
Non-GAAP earnings are measures that include or exclude amounts that the most directly 
comparable number presented under US GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles) does not.      
 
Non-GAAP earnings can provide useful information about company performance. 
However, companies have substantial discretion over non-GAAP earnings. In particular:   
  
 There is considerable variation the way non-GAAP earnings are calculated.   
 There is considerable variation in the labeling of non-GAAP measures.  
 
Based on this bulletin, which of the following is true about non-GAAP earnings? Select all 
that apply. 
▢  There is considerable variation in the calculation and labeling of non-GAAP 
earnings.  
▢  Manager's have no discretion in the calculation of non-GAAP earnings.  
▢  Non-GAAP earnings measures deviate from US GAAP (Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles).  






A company is preparing "core income", a non-GAAP metric. In arriving at the core 




















Attention check:  What label will the firm use for their non-GAAP income metric? 
o "Core" income  










A company is preparing "core income", a non-GAAP metric. In arriving at the core 




















You also compare the amounts of these expense line items to the industry average, and 
find that they are in line with the industry average.  
 
 
Attention check:  What label will the firm use for their non-GAAP income metric? 
o "Core" income  




The following page will ask you about these expenses.  
 
Note: There were two conditions: one that did not include a statement about the 
industry average and one that did. This was to test if it was important that the 
reconciling items not be unusual in their amount. No effect was found, and this 
statement was dropped in future versions of experimental materials.  
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Rank each of the expense items the company could add back to GAAP net income when 
calculating core income from (1) most appropriate to (4) least appropriate by dragging the 
items into the proper order.  
______ Research and development expense 
______ Stock based compensation expense 
______ Amortization expense 
______ Income tax expense 
 
 
How appropriate is it for the company to add back research and development expense to 
GAAP net income when calculating core income? 





How appropriate is it for the company to add back stock based compensation expense to 
GAAP net income when calculating core income? 





How appropriate is it for the company to add back amortization expense to GAAP net 
income when calculating core income? 





How appropriate is it for the company to add back income tax expense to GAAP net 
income when calculating core income? 
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